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In 1947, as part of the Taft-Hartley amendments ' to the National
Labor Relations Act, Congress enacted the secondary boycott section,'
thereby opening a can of legal worms which remains unsealed to this
day. Because a literal construction would not only prohibit the second-
ary activities the section's sponsors sought to reach,' but also forbid an
employee to picket his own employer, the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board) and the courts quickly retreated to the section's
legislative history to distinguish between permissible "primary activity"
and illegal "secondary activity" ' in its administration. The legislators'
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1 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, amending
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
2 NLRA § 8(b) (4) (B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1964). The section was
originally enacted as § 8(b) (4) (A), but was redesignated § 8(b) (4) (B) and amended
in respects not material here by the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act
of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 704, 73 Stat. 542. The amended version reads:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual em-
ployed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to
use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work on any
goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in
an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person,
or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a
labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964). See also NLRA § 303, 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964), providing
private remedies for violations of § 8(b) (4) (B).
3 All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effect of the law as to
secondary boycotts. It has been set forth that there are good secondary
boycotts and bad secondary boycotts. Our committee heard evidence for
weeks and never succeeded in having anyone tell us any difference . ...
So we have so broadened the provision dealing with secondary boycotts as
to make them an unfair labor practice.
93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
4 E.g., NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 686 (1951); see
NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665 (1951). Rice Millihkq held
that inducing neutral deliverymen to refuse to cross a picket line at the primary
employer's premises did not constitute the type of "concerted activity" banned by the
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concept of secondary conduct lacked practical guidelines,
5 however, and
the ensuing morass of litigation over the alleged secondary nature of
various union activities is too familiar to all labor lawyers.
6
Act, but the opinion hints at a broader holding comparable to Denver Building. See
id. at 671-72. For an early discussion of this point, see Metal Polishers Local 171
(Climax Mach. Co.), 86 N.L.R.B. 1243, 1250-51 (1949). See generally A. Cox,
LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLIcY 34 (1960).
5 Senator Ellender rendered the following definition:
A secondary boycott, as all of us know, is a concerted attempt on the
part of a strong union to compel employers to deal with them, even though
the employees of that employer desire to be represented by other unions, or
not to be represented at all.
93 CONG. REc. 4132 (1947). Senator Murray, however, admitted the existence of
a problem:
[T]here are few issues that are more complicated and more illusive than those
connected with secondary boycotts. Here we have a term which is almost
incapable of any precise definition ....
Id. 4844. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed the existence of a definitional
problem:
No cosmic principles announce the existence of secondary conduct, con-
demn it as an evil, or delimit its boundaries. . . . And the common law of
labor relations has created no concept more elusive than that of "secondary"
conduct; it has drawn no lines more arbitrary, tenuous, and shifting than
those separating "primary" from "secondary" activities.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 386-87
(1969).
6 The more prominent controversies have included: Whether picketing by primary
employees at sites occupied by several employers is "secondary." See Sailors' Union
of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). Compare Oil
Workers Local 346 (Pure Oil Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949) and Electrical Workers
Local 813 (Ryan Constr. Corp.), 85 N.L.R.B. 417 (1949), with Retail Clerks' Local
1017 (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956), enforced, 249 F2d 591 (9th
Cir. 1957) and Seafarers' Int'l Union (Salt Dome Prod. Co.), 119 N.L.R.B. 1638
(1958), enforcement denied, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959) and Chemical Workers
Local 36 (Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.), 126 N.L.R.B. 905 (1960). Whether the
existence of another site at which the union could adequately picket the primary
makes picketing a common site secondary. Compare Brewery Workers Local 67
(Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc.), 107 N.L.R.B. 299 (1953), enforced,
220 F,2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955), with Electrical Workers Local 861 (Plauche Elec.,
Inc.), 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962). Whether pressuring one's employer to remedy con-
ditions over which another employer exercises sole legal control is secondary. Com-
pare Longshoremen's Local 1066 (Wiggin Terminals, Inc.), 137 N.L.R.B. 45 (1962)
and Journeymen Plumbers Local 5 (Arthur Venneri Co.), 137 N.L.R.B. 828 (1962),
enforced as modified, 321 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1963), with Pipe Fitters Local 539
(American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n), 154 N.L.R.B. 314 (1965), remanded, 366 F.2d 823
(8th Cir. 1966), on remand, 167 N.L.R.B. 606 (1967), enforced, 404 F.2d 547 (8th
Cir. 1968). Whether picketing an employer whose terms of employment are inferior
to the primary employer's is secondary. Compare United Mine Workers (Arthur J.
Galligan), 144 N.L.R.B. 228 (1963) and Sheet Metal Workers' Local 98 (Cincinnati
Sheet Metal & Roofing Co.), 174 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 70 L.R.R.M. 1119 (1969), with
Orange Belt Dist. Council 48 v. NLRB (Calhoun Dry Wall Co.), 328 F.2d 534
(D.C. Cir. 1964) ; cf. Meat Drivers Local 710 (Wilson & Co.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d
709 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Whether primary employees' refusal to handle material pro-
duced by another employer in order to preserve work formerly done by them is
secondary. Compare Washington-Oregon Shingle Weavers (Sound Shingle Co.),
101 N.L.R.B. 1159 (1952), enforced, 211 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1954), with Longshore-
men's Local 19 (Pacific Maritime Ass'n), 137 N.L.R.B. 119 (1962) and Metropolitan
Dist. Council of Phila. (National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n), 149 N.L.R.B. 646 (1964),
enforcement denied, 354 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 612 (1967). And
whether the same refusals to acquire work not formerly done by such primary em-
ployees are secondary. Compare Retail Clerks Local 770 (Food Employers Council,
Inc.), 127 N.L.R.B. 1522 (1960), enforced in part, 296 F2d 368 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
and Asbestos Workers Local 8 (Preformed Metal Prods. Co.), 173 N.L.R.B. No. 55,
THE ALLY DOCTRINE
Yet whether or not concerted activity is technically "secondary,"
if it is directed against an employer who is "firmly allied" in economic
interest with the primary employer, it will be treated as primary action
not subject to the ban of section 8(b) (4) (B). This concept of alliance
has no statutory basis; instead it was implied from the historical treat-
ment of secondary union activity and the section's legislative history.
During congressional debate on the secondary boycott section, Senator
Taft explained that "[t]his provision makes it unlawful to resort to a
secondary boycott to injure the business of a third person who is wholly
unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his em-
ployees." 7 On this slender reed Judge Rifkind decided Douds v.
Metropolitan Federation of Architects (Ebasco),8 in which the ally
doctrine was born.9
In Ebasco the Board's Regional Director sought a preliminary
injunction '0 against striking Ebasco employees who also picketed
Project Engineering, causing some of the latter's draftsmen to quit.
An independent partnership, Project had done "an appreciable per-
centage" " of its business with Ebasco prior to the strike under a cost-
plus contract giving Ebasco the power to supervise the work done by
Project's employees and set ceilings on their wages. After the strike
began, Project performed a significantly greater amount of work for
Ebasco, some of which was transferred to Project in the half-finished
state in which the strikers left it. Noting that the increased work was
precisely that which Ebasco's employees would have done but for the
69 L.R.R.M. 1344 (1968), with Retail Clerks Local 876 (Independent Biscuit Co.),
174 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 70 L.R.R.M. 1213 (1969).
Many of these problems have been analyzed in Lesnick, The Gravamen of the
Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1363 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Gravamen] ;
Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and
8(e), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1000 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Job Security]; Note,
Common Situs Rules Fade Away as NLRB and Courts Look to Object of Unio's
Picketing in Taft-Hartley Section (8)(b)(4)(A) Cases, 45 GEo. L.J. 614 (1957).
793 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947) (emphasis added). Senator Taft continued:
There is no reason . . . why we should make it lawful for persons to incite
workers to strike when they are perfectly satisfied with their conditions.
If their conditions are not satisfactory, then it is perfectly lawful to encourage
them to strike.
Id.
875 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
9 The ally doctrine has been usefully examined in Asher, Secondary Boycotts-
Allied, Neutral and Single Employers, 52 GEo. L.J. 406 (1964); Gravamen 1418;
Meyer, "Ally" or "Neutral"-The Secondary Boycott Dilemma, 34 TUL. L. REV. 343
(1960) ; Note, The "Ally" Doctrine Under Section 8(b)(4)(B): A Functional Ap-
proach, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 508 (1962) ; Note, Hot Cargo Agreements Under the
National Labor Relations Act: An Analysis of Section 8(e), 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 97,
121-24 (1963) ; Note, Secondary Boycotts and Labor Reform, 34 N.Y.U.L. REv.
1299, 1306-10 (1959).
10 Section 10(1) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1964), grants federal district
courts jurisdiction to restrain activity temporarily when the regional attorney "has
reasonable cause to believe" that the activity constitutes an unfair labor practice.
"175 F. Supp. at 674.
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strike, that the effect of Project's activities on the strike was exactly the
same as though Ebasco had hired strikebreakers, and that if strike-
breakers could be appealed to at Ebasco's premises they could be ap-
pealed to elsewhere, Judge Rifkind concluded that section 8(b) (4) (B)
did not protect the "business" of indirect strikebreaking. In denying
the Director's petition, the court noted that:
To suggest that Project had no interest in the dispute between
Ebasco and its employees is to look at the form and remain
blind to substance. In every meaningful sense [Project] had
made itself party to the contest. Manifestly it was not an
innocent bystander, nor a neutral. It was firmly allied to
Ebasco and it was its conduct as ally of Ebasco which directly
provoked the union's action.
• . . The conduct of the union in inducing Project's
employees to strike is not different in kind from its conduct in
inducing Ebasco's employees to strike. If the latter is not
amenable to judicial restraint, neither is the former.
The case at bar is not an instance of a secondary boy-
cott.'
2
By confirming that the section could not be construed literally, the
Ebasco court generated as many questions as it answered. The court
relied on its construction of the section's "doing business" language; an
equally sound theory would have been that because Ebasco exercised
enough "detailed and pervasive" control over Project's employees to
make them its own apart from their performance of "farmed-out struck
work," Project was not an "other person" entitled to the protection of
the statute.3 If Project could be picketed as a primary because its
workers by doing struck work became Ebasco's replacement employees,
it should also be reachable as a primary if its workers were Ebasco's
regular employees, regardless of struck work. In addition, although
12 Id. at 676-77 (emphasis added). The decision also alluded to § 13 of the
NLRA preserving the right to strike, id. at 675, and suggested that a construction
of § 8 (b) (4) (B) prohibiting the picketing in question might be an unconstitutional
restriction on the picketers' first amendment rights under Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940). This raised the question whether the ally doctrine would be nar-
rowed if the courts limited the protection afforded picketing under the first amend-
ment. See Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). By the time
such narrowing took place, however, the ally doctrine was sufficiently established to
stand on its own.
13 75 F. Supp. at 676. The opinion expressly noted that in addition to wielding
detailed control over Project's employees, Ebasco treated them as its own by failing
to segregate them in its invoicing and public advertising. The court also refused to
give effect to a contractual provision that Project's employees were to remain
Project's on the ground that the provision merely revealed the parties' awareness
that their relationship "cast a shadow of doubt upon the identity of the employer."
Id. at 677; cf. NLRB v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 167 F2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948),
enforcing 73 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1947) (§ 8(a) (1) action).
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the case would probably have come out differently in the absence of
struck work,' it was unclear whether without these other strands of
interrelatedness the outcome would have remained the same. The
court seemed to find Project allied with Ebasco on two grounds, neither
of which would have been sufficient by itself: Ebasco's control of
Project's employees under the contract and Project's performance of
struck work. Only when both elements were present could one guar-
antee that the Board and the courts would not distinguish the decision
when future controversies arose.' 5
This ambiguity raised difficult questions concerning the extent
of union liability for common types of concerted activity--questions
whose solutions were crucial to both unions and management. The
conclusion that a boycotted secondary employer was "neutral" with
respect to the primary dispute would expose the boycotters not only to
an eventual injunction under section 8(b) (4) (B), but also to an im-
mediate "temporary" injunction under section 10(l)," to potentially
crippling damage suits under section 303,17 and after 1959 to the void-
14 "[N]or do I indicate any opinion as to the application of the Act if the normal
volume of subcontracting work in this case had not been increased .... " 75 F.
Supp. at 677.
15 Indeed, the case has been distinguished both in the single enterprise area
because "[in Ebasco] the employees . . . were all working for the same employer and
had practically identical interests." NLRB v. Wine Workers Local 1 (Schenley
Distillers Corp.), 178 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1949), and in the struck work area
because Ebasco supposedly involved a parent-subsidiary relationship, McLeod v.
Local 365, UAW (Intertype Co.), 200 F. Supp. 778, 781 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 299
F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1962). An early statement of the Ebasco rule similarly emphasized
both elements:
If, however, the relationship between the two employers is so close that
the employees of the second employer work under the direct supervision of
the struck employer, and are doing a considerable amount of additional work
as the result of the strike, it may be found that the second employer is an
"ally" of the struck employer ....
Annot., 16 A.L.R2d 769, 779 (1951).
16 For testimony to the damaging effect of a temporary injunction on a union's
attempt to bring sustained economic pressure to bear on an employer, see F. FRANK-
FURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTIoN 200-02 (1930). The possibility that
the district court will blindly follow what it perceives to be the Board's "rule"
presents another danger to the union. See, e.g., Squillacote v. Teamsters Local 695
(Chase Ready-Mix, Inc.), 60 L.R.R.M. 2057, 2060 (W.D. Wis. 1965) ("generally ad-
visable . . . to seek to determine the prevailing view of the Labor Board"). See
also Brown v. Lithographers Local 17, 180 F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (doubts
resolved in favor of issuing temporary injunction in light of congressional intent to
limit effect of disputes).
17 Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
Primary employers injured by secondary action may also bring suits under this
section. E.g., United Brick Workers Union v. Deena Artware, Inc., 198 F2d
637, 643-44 (6th Cir. 1952); Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871, 878
(E.D. Tenn. 1963), rev'd on other grounds, 383 U.S. 715 (1965). For a time courts
magnified the risk by allowing punitive damages pursuant to both § 303 suits and
state law conspiracy actions entertained under pendent jurisdiction. Mine Workers
District 19 v. Osborne Mining Co., 279 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
881 (1960); Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
In 1964 the Supreme Court eliminated this danger by holding that § 303 preempts all
state law actions against nonviolent secondary activity and permits only compensatory
damages therefor. Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
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ing of any collective bargaining contract clause permitting such boy-
cotts.'8 A finding that the secondary employer forced to "cease doing
business" with the primary employer was "allied" with that primary
was a complete defense to these charges."
Under steady union pressure to define more precisely the situations
in which this immunity for secondary-type activity was available, the
Board and the courts eventually split the ally doctrine in thirds. The
first third, based on the secondary's performance of struck work, will
be designated the "farmed-out struck work" concept; the last two, based
on significant breakdowns in the normal barriers between business en-
tities dealing at arm's length, will be labelled the "single enterprise"
and the "coemployer" concepts. This Article seeks to raise the ques-
tions in response to which each concept developed, to make explicit the
principles underlying their development, and to demonstrate how, under
the impact of political forces and complex factual variations, the de-
cisional bodies have unreasonably deviated from the controlling con-
siderations which they initially set out.
I. FARMED-OUT STRUCK WORK
Ebasco immediately raised a series of questions concerning farmed-
out struck work. May the striking primary employees appeal to the
secondary employer's workers if the latter perform struck work with-
out other primary-secondary ties? Next,' if simply performing struck
work suffices to strip the secondary employer of his neutrality
vis-A-vis the primary's labor dispute, the question arises: what is
"struck work"? Does a secondary employer who advances a struck
primary employer easy credit or initiates poststrike business dealings
with him so help the primary as to lose his protection as a neutral, on
18NLRA § 8 (e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964). Under 8(e) any agreement between
union and employer to boycott any other employer is void.
The result is that § 8(b) (4) in conjunction with § 8(e) provides three
degrees of permissibility respecting picketing in connection with agreements
to cease doing business with certain persons: (1) As to the garment industry,
picketing to secure and to enforce is permissible; (2) as to the construction
industry, picketing to secure is permissible but (under §8(b)(4)(B))
picketing to enforce is proscribed; (3) as to all other industries, picketing
both to secure and to enforce is proscribed.
Construction Laborers Local 383 v. NLRB (Colson & Stevens Constr. Co.), 323 F.2d
422, 425 (9th Cir. 1963).
19The ally doctrine is applicable under §303(b) of the LMRA and §8(e) of
the NLRA since they both incorporate § 8(b) (4) (B)'s standards. Teamsters Local
20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 n.13 (1964); Longshoremen's Local 16 v. Juneau
Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1952) (§ 303 violation) ; Teamsters Local 413
v. NLRB (The Patton Warehouse, Inc.), 334 F.2d 539, 546-47 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 916 (§ 8(e) charge), enforcing in part 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963);
NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers Local 17, 309 F2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963) (§ 8(e) charge) ; see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n
v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 626-28 (1967) (§8(e) charge) (dictum). See also Job
Security 1013.
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the ground that such actions are only made possible by the labor of
the secondary's employees, who are therefore strikebreakers once-
removed? Is an express agreement to perform the struck work
necessary? In the absence of an agreement, the secondary's employees
cannot be fairly inferred to be the primary's, and without requiring that
the secondary receive some notice that he is accepting struck work, his
normal business dealings would be at his peril. If the secondary uses
his employees to perform services normally rendered by a shut-down
primary and thereby relieves the primary of the pressures the secondary
would otherwise apply to encourage him to settle the dispute, can
primary employees picket his premises? In addition, Ebasco left
"farming out" undefined. If a strike-bound primary closes its facilities
and later finances a related enterprise through a different corporation,
how close must the timing and type of business be before the strikers
can successfully argue that but for the strike they would be doing the
new corporation's work?
A. Basic Doctrine
The doubt remaining after Ebasco over whether doing struck
work would per se deprive a secondary employer of the protection
afforded neutrals by section 8(b) (4) (B) was dispelled in NLRB v.
Business Machine Mechanics Local 459 (Royal Typewriter Co.).
2
0
Struck by its repairmen, Royal instructed customers to whom it owed
repair obligations to have their typewriters fixed by any independent
repair company, pay for the repairs, and send the receipts to Royal for
reimbursement. Most of these customers simply sent Royal their
unpaid bills, which Royal paid directly. Apart from this payment
procedure, Royal had no contact with the independents.
When the striking Royal repairmen picketed two of the inde-
pendents, the Trial Examiner found a violation of section 8 (b) (4) (B),
distinguishing Ebasco on the ground that a direct consensual relation-
ship must be established before the primary and secondary employers
could be held "allied." 21 The Board affirmed, 2 but the Second Circuit,
20228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956).
21 Business Mach. Mech. Local 459 (Royal Typewriter Co.), 111 N.L.R.B. 317,
328 (1955). The Trial Examiner found a third independent allied on the basis of
a direct oral agreement with Royal and recommended dismissing the charges filed
by it. Id. at 329. This part of the intermediate proceedings was not appealed.
The striking employees also picketed several of Royal's customers suspected of
utilizing the independents for repairs. This activity clearly violated § 8(b) (4) (B)
because the union admitted it was attempting to force the customers to cease doing
business with Royal. Id. at 325-27.
22 The decision contained an unhelpful explanation that, although the Board was
not reviewing the Examiner's interpretation of Ebasco, the union had failed to
sustain its burden of proving an alliance. Id. at 318. Member Peterson dissented,
arguing that the independents were allies. Id. at 321.
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noting that the repair work performed by the independents "would in-
evitably tend to break the strike" 23 and that the independents were
enriching themselves and preserving Royal's goodwill at the strikers'
expense, denied enforcement. The court concluded that the union's
interest in appealing to strikebreakers outweighed the independents'
right to be free from secondary pressure when the latter could easily
avoid the pressure by refusing the struck work.
[A]n employer is not within the protection of § 8(b) (4) (A)
when he knowingly does work which would otherwise be
done by the striking employees of the primary employer and
where this work is paid for by the primary employer pursuant
to an arrangement devised and originated by him to enable
him to meet his contractual obligations. The result must be
the same whether or not the primary employer makes any
direct arrangement with the employers providing the
services.
24
The court also found that the secondaries had a duty to make a good
faith effort to avoid doing struck work-a duty which in effect de-
manded actual avoidance.25 Expanding on the majority opinion, Judge
Hand explicitly equated paying the secondary for doing struck work
with subcontracting, and advocated placing on the secondary the burden
of showing that the work would not have been done by the primary
absent the strike.26
Royal Typewriter established the core of the struck work doctrine:
when a secondary does work which but for the strike would have
been done by the strikers, and that work helps the primary to avoid
the strike's impact by continuing to provide goods and services to his
customers in his name, the primary is using the secondary employees as
strikebreakers, and the union may appeal to them as though the primary
had imported them onto his premises. Any other holding would
enable the primary to evade legitimate economic pressure by restricting
his employees' traditional right to appeal not only to their fellows, but
also to anyone hired to replace them.
The case's subsidiary holdings demonstrate the paramount im-
portance of the primary employees' right to pressure their employer.
23 228 F2d at 558.
2 4 Id. at 559.
25 A case may arise where the ally employer is unable to determine that the
work he is doing is "farmed out." . . . [But] [w]herever they worked on
new Royal machines [the independents] were probably aware that such
machines were covered by a Royal warranty. . . . [and] in any event, before
working on a Royal machine they could have inquired of the customer
whether it was covered by a Royal contract and refused to work on it if
it was.
Id. 2 61d. at 562 (concurring opinion).
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Although the opinion specifically noted that in both Ebasco and Royal
Typewriter the union notified the secondaries that they were doing
struck work before picketing them, the court reduced its "knowingly"
requirement to a fiction by remarking that picketing itself gave the
secondaries adequate notice of the nature of the work." Similarly, the
court treated the requirement that the secondary "inject itself into the
dispute" as largely metaphorical, reasoning that whether the impetus
for the arrangement came from the secondary employer or from the
primary the adverse effect on the strike would be the same.28 Finally,
for the same reason that the court did not require an express arrange-
ment to establish the ally relationship, it found that the lack of direct
payments to the secondaries did not affect the outcome: secondary
employees used as strikebreakers remained strikebreakers, whether or
not they were specifically designated or paid by the primary.
For ten years after Ebasco, the Board, while acknowledging the
existence of the court-created struck work rule, found no case requiring
its affirmative application.2 9 But the first quartet of cases in which the
Board held the doctrine to be a complete defense to secondary boycott
charges firmly supports the interpretation of Royal Typewriter outlined
above.
In Shopmen's Local 501 (Oliver WIyte Co.), 30 the secondary
processed wire for the struck primary employer from which all insignia
had been removed so that the secondary employees could not identify
the farmed-out pieces. 3 When the primary employees picketed the
27 1d. at 559; see General Drivers Local 563 (Fox Valley Material Suppliers
Ass'n), 176 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 71 L.R.R.M. 1231, 1234-35 (1969) (unknowing per-
formance of struck work no defense).
28 If the impetus came solely from the primary's customers, however, no issue of
farmed-out work would arise. See text accompanying notes 80-89 infra.
2°See, e.g., Chauffeurs Local 135 (Marsh Foodliners, Inc.), 114 N.L.R.B. 639
(1955); Business Mach. Mech. Local 459 (Royal Typewriter Co.), 111 N.L.R.B.
317 (1955); Metal Polishers Local 171 (Climax Mach. Co.), 86 N.L.R.B. 1243
(1949). In the most pregnant early example, Oil Workers Local 346 (Pure Oil
Co.), 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949), Pure Oil enjoyed loading privileges on a cost-sharing
basis at a Standard Oil dock manned by Standard Oil employees. During the 60-day
notice period prior to the strike, Pure Oil made an agreement with Standard Oil
that in the event of a labor dispute with Standard, Pure Oil would be permitted to
operate the dock to load its ships. When Standard's employees struck and picketed
the dock, Pure Oil's workmen refused to cross the picket line. Citing Ebasco, the
Trial Examiner found that Pure Oil's attempt to provide services normally provided
by the striking Standard employees created an alliance between the two companies.
Id. at 330. The case raised prophetic questions regarding the validity of predispute
arrangements, the nature of the benefit the secondary's activities must yield the
primary, and whether by sharing the costs (including labor expenses) of maintaining
the dock, the two companies became coemployers of the dock workers. The Board,
however, held the picketing to be legitimate on the basis of the now-discredited
title-to-situs doctrine and never reached these issues. Id. at 319. For critiques of
the title-to-situs doctrine, see Steelworkers Local 5895 v. NLRB (Carrier Corp,),
376 U.S. 492, 497-99 (1964); Retail Clerks' Local 1017 (Crystal Palace Mkt.), 116
N.L.R.B. 856, 858-59 (1956), enforced, 249 F2d 591 (9th Cir. 1957).
30 120 N.L.R.B. 856 (1958).
31 Id. at 859.
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secondary and induced a complete work stoppage, the secondary argued
that the picketing was an unfair labor practice because it halted not only
struck work but also work for his other customers. The Trial Exam-
iner noted that a partial work stoppage involving only the struck work
might be an unfair labor practice by the secondary workers or a valid
ground for discharging them,32 and then explained that a secondary
employer doing struck work was equivalent to a primary who could
be picketed with regard to all his work.
[Olnce an employer "allies" himself with the primary em-
ployer whose employees are on strike, he stands in the shoes
of the primary employer so that the union may lawfully exert
the same type of pressures against the former employer as it
may against the latter.33
The Board reasoned that to limit the primary employees to inducing
only a partial work stoppage would overly restrict their traditional right
to appeal to all primary employees, even those doing work unrelated
to the strikers' task.34
The potential argument that Oliver Whyte's "in the shoes" ruling
was only required by the inability of the secondary employees to identify
struck work was quashed by the Board three weeks later. In Inter-
national Die Sinkers Lodge 410 (General Metals Corp.)," the primary
employees, members of the machinists union, picketed General Metals,
the secondary employer. Representing the relevant General Metals em-
ployees, the die sinkers local instructed its members to refuse to perform
the primary's easily identified work. When General Metals fired the
workers refusing to work, the die sinkers walked out, joining the pri-
mary employees' picket line. The Board held that because the second-
ary's premises were "the situs of farmed-out or struck work which
[General Metals] was knowingly performing for another," the machin-
ists union could legally picket there, 6 and went on to find that the die
sinkers did not participate in prohibited secondary activity by inducing
the secondary employees to refuse to perform struck work. Regardless
of the scope of the struck goods clause in their contract with General
Metals, the die sinkers local had a legitimate primary interest in stop-
32 Id. at 860. This possibility would be eliminated if the contract contained a
valid clause permitting refusals to handle struck work. But cf. International Die
Sinkers Lodge 410 (General Metals Corp.), 120 N.L.R.B. 1227 (1958).
33 120 N.L.R.B. at 862 (emphasis added).
34 See Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668 (1967);
NLRB v. General Drivers Local 968 (Otis Massey Co.). 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 3"0 U.S. 914 (1955) ; Administrative Ruling of the General Counsel,
Case No. SR-99, 44 L.R.R.M. 1516 (1959).
35 120 N.L.R.3. 1227 (1958).
36 Id. at 1228.
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ping the secondary from making its members strikebreakers in another
dispute. 3' Given the strength of the secondary employees' interest in
preventing strikebreaking, that of the primary employees could only be
stronger; the legality of the latter group's general picketing was treated
as settled.
Within three months after deciding General Metals, the Board ap-
proved a primary union's inducement of a slowdown against a second-
ary employer who had agreed before the strike to perform deliveries
normally made by the strikers, reasoning that-like the primary-the
secondary could be subjected to a slowdown in his whole business."'
Three months later the Board carried the "in the shoes" concept even
further. In Teamsters Local 324 (Truck Operators League of Oregon),39
when struck beer distributors hired ICC common carriers to accept and
deliver beer consigned to them, their striking employees also picketed
the carriers' trucks when they made deliveries for the primaries. Be-
cause the carriers argued that their common law and Interstate Com-
merce Act duties to perform any requested service prevented them from
choosing whether to enter the dispute and that to subject them to eco-
nomic pressure would therefore be inequitable, the case offered a seem-
ingly strong factual basis for limiting the "in the shoes" doctrine.
Nevertheless, the Board rejected the carriers' argument with the remark
that secondary employers doing struck work were primary and that if
the union could strike a primary employer who was a common carrier,
it could picket an ally who was.4"
These cases correctly reveal the basic standard to be whether the
primary employer's use of the secondary employees is sufficiently similar
in impact on the effectiveness of the strike to equate appeals to the
secondary employees with appeals to strikebreakers entering the pri-
mary's premises. If the secondary employees' labor directly decreases
the economic impact of the strike on the primary,41 the secondary em-
ployees can be generally reached. Whether the primary employer's
arrangement with the secondary is created after the strike begins or in
anticipation of the strike is irrelevant because the effect upon the strike
37 But compare Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336
U.S. 245. 255-56 (1949), with NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Union, 361 U.S. 477,
492-96 (1960), on the validity of General Metals' initial discharge of the refusing
employees. See also NLRB v. Alamo Express, Inc., 74 L.R.R.M. 2742 (5th Cir.
1970) ; Teamsters Local 657 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
38 Brewery Workers Local 366 (Adolph Coors Co.), 121 N.L.R.B. 271, 275-76
(1958), enforcement denied on other grounds, 272 F2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959).
39 122 N.L.R.B. 25 (1958).
40 Id. at 27 & n.8.
41 The test may be alternatively phrased in terms of the benefit to the primary
of the secondaries' labor or the harmful effect of their labor on the strike against
the primary. See text accompanying notes 80-89 infra.
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will be the same.' On the other hand, alliance is not proven if the
primary simply receives financial aid from the secondary. Although
this aid does help the primary resist the strike, the secondary employees
cannot be equated with strikebreakers since they are not performing
the strikers' work.
Two major attacks have been launched against this basic doctrine.
The first argues that no secondary should be exposed to pressure from
striking employees because the psychological threat that the secondary
will retain the transferred customers after the strike will suffice to coerce
the primary into a rapid settlement.4" The second, while acknowledging
the primary employees' right to reach the secondaries, argues that "in
the case of farmed-out struck work the appeal to the pickets should be
limited to [halting] the farmed-out work of the primary employer." 44
But the first of these arguments misconceives the doctrine's rationale,
while the second must fail for a series of policy reasons.
With respect to the first argument, the primary employer farms out
struck work to continue his business, not to lose it; the very act of
farming out the work implies a decision that his business is less likely
to be diminished by transferring work to a secondary than by importing
strikebreakers or ceasing to operate the plant. For the primary, the
psychological impact of continuing business through a secondary would
thus be in most instances a positive force tending to prolong the strike.
But even if the effect were negative, the struck work doctrine protects
the strikers' right to bring economic as well as psychological pressure
to bear on the primary employer, even when the economic pressure is
de minimus.4" A rule allowing the primary employer to choose his
strikebreakers with impunity would seriously curtail this right.
With respect to the second argument, nothing intrinsic to the
doctrine requires that the secondary's whole business stand "in the
shoes" of the primary when only part of it is performing struck work.
Yet insofar as partial refusals to work are unfair labor practices or
grounds for discharge under state or federal law, the primary employees'
only alternatives are to induce all or none of the secondary's workers to
42 See Teamsters Local 901 (Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 895,
906-08 (1961) ; Teamsters Local 560 (Pennsylvania R.R.), 127 N.L.R.B. 1327 (1960).
43See 7 SYRACUSE L. REv. 321, 322 (1956).
44 Engel, Secondary Consumer Picketing-Following the Struck Product, 52 VA.
L. RFv. 189, 209 n.74 (1966). See also Warehouse Union Local 6 (Hershey Chocolate
Corp.), 153 N.L.R.B. 1051, 1061 (1965).
45See Masters, Mates & Pilots Local 28 (Ingram Barge Co.), 136 N.L.R.B.
1175, 1187 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("I am not aware that
in the formulation and acceptance of the 'ally' concept . . . the importance of the
struck work is weighed . . ."). As Judge Rifkind noted in the Ebasco case,
"[tihe effect of a strike would be vastly attenuated if its appeals were limited to
the employer's conscience." 75 F. Supp. at 675.
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stop working completely, and the latter choice empties the right to strike
of all significance. Thus, a rule limiting unions to inducing refusals to
do struck work would eliminate the one viable alternative they presently
possess. Moreover, the suggested limitation would facilitate a pri-
mary employer's efforts to evade the effect of a strike. Evasion could
then be accomplished either by farming out struck work piecemeal so
that strikers cannot tell which of many possible secondaries is perform-
ing it, or by creating a runaway shop situation in which the first
secondary when picketed immediately reconsigns his struck work to the
next. In either case the primary employees would be forced to investi-
gate or picket all potential secondaries, resulting in an immense drain
on their finances and morale. The "in the shoes" doctrine provides a
powerful deterrent to this kind of subterfuge,4" without imposing an
inordinate burden on the secondary, who can always escape the pressure
by simply refusing all struck work. Thus, the balancing test underlying
all 8 (b) (4) (B) cases- the primary employees' right to exert economic
pressure on their employer versus the secondary's right to be free from
pressure emanating from a dispute "not his own" 47-clearly favors the
unions in this situation.
B. What Is Struck Work?: "Work which but for ... "
Given the antistrikebreaking rationale of the struck work doctrine,
the crucial question is often whether the work performed by the second-
ary is "work which but for the strike would have been performed by the
primary's employees." Difficulties in applying this formula to effectuate
the doctrine's rationale have led to several divergences from the basic
equation, which will be clarified by eliminating the easier cases.
The formula itself indicates that when a secondary employer
performs a subcontract concluded with the primary without reference
to evading a strike, he does not become the primary's ally because the
contracted work would be done by the secondary employees regardless
of the strike."' Even when the secondary's product if sold to the pri-
mary directly contributes to his efforts to resist the strike, the sec-
46 The rule that picketing a secondary reasonably believed to be doing struck
work remains primary activity until the secondary affirmatively notifies the pickets
that it has permanently ceased performing struck work also serves to deter a
primary's efforts to avoid a strike's impact. See Laundry Workers Local 259
(California Laundry & Linen Supply), 164 N.L.R.B. 426 (1967).
47 See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951).
48 Cuneo v. Teamsters Local 575 (Dierickx Vending Co.), 210 F. Supp. 450,
453-54 (D.N.J. 1962) ; Teamsters Local 728 (Brown Transport Corp.), 140 N.L.R.B.
1436 (1963) ; Mailers' Union No. 6 (Publishers Ass'n), 136 N.L.R.B. 196 (1962),
enforced, 316 F2d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (only refusals to handle farmed-out struck
work sanctioned); Business Mach. Mech. Local 459 (Friden, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B.
598, 607-08 (1961); Metal Polishers Local 171 (Climax Mach. Co.), 86 N.L.R.B.
1243, 1253 (1949) ; cf. Wine Workers Local 1 (Schenley Distillers Corp.), 78
N.L.R.B. 504, 507 (1948), enforced 178 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1949) (independent sales
outlet not an ally).
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ondary's production cannot be equated with strikebreaking. Any other
holding would isolate the primary from all suppliers and clog commerce
by forcing the secondary to investigate the primary's labor status as a
condition precedent to every sale.49 Similarly, a secondary does not
become an ally merely because the primary employer continues to do
business with him using supervisors and nonstriking employees.50 The
supervisors, not the secondary, perform the struck work, and the
primary employees have an adequate chance to appeal to them at the
primary's premises. In addition, subcontracting work formerly done
by a bargaining unit of primary employees does not create an alliance,
even when this action will foreseeably cause the primary employees to
strike,5' for the subcontracting is neither a result of nor an attempt to
evade a strike; the primary employees cannot show that but for their
strike, they would be performing the work.
In other situations, however, the emphasis shifts from the identity
of the workers who would normally perform the transferred work to
the primary employer's ability to escape legitimate pressure by farming
out the work. For instance, when an outside union seeking recognition
from a primary employer pickets both the secondary and the primary,52
49See Steel Fabricators Local 810 (Fein Can Corp.), 131 N.L.R.B. 59, 71
(1961), enforced, 299 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1962) (secondary continued to provide
essential shipping service). Even when the sales are made on a nonregular basis
after the strike begins and the product is one whose use for strikebreaking is
reasonably foreseeable, the struck work doctrine should not apply because the primary
employees have an adequate opportunity to stop deliveries of the product at the
primary's premises.
"OSee Chauffeurs Local 135 (Marsh Foodliners, Inc.), 114 N.L.R.B. 639, 642
(1955) (when carriers transfer goods to primary's nonstriking trucks in secondary's
parking lot to avoid pickets, the secondary is not an ally). See also Warehouse
Workers Local 688 (Acme Paper Co.), 121 N.L.R.B. 702 (1958) (ally defense not
raised).
51 Warehouse Union Local 6 (Hershey Chocolate Corp.), 153 N.L.R.B. 1051,
1064 (1965); Teamsters Local 25 (J. C. Driscoll Transp., Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. 845
(1964) ; Highway Truckdrivers Local 107 (Riss & Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 943, 950
n.15 (1961), enforced, 300 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1962); Longshoremen's Local 13
(Catalina Island Sightseeing Lines), 124 N.L.R.B. 813, 830 (1959). By subcon-
tracting, however, the employer may be engaging in an unfair labor practice in
violation of § 8(a) (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1964). See Fibre-
board Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209-15 (1964) (duty to bargain
encompasses subcontracting of work previously performed by union members).
The result may also differ when the primary employees have a contractual right
to the contracted-out work and the subcontracting arrangement is made in anticipation
of an unrelated strike. See Steelworkers Local 4203 (TCI), 127 N.L.R.B. 823, 826,
enforced as vnodified, 294 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; cf. McLeod v. Electrotypers'
Local 100 (Rapid Electrotype Co.), 49 L.R.R.M. 2945 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (§ 10(l)
injunction), in which the primary decided to use plates made by the secondary and
consequently discharged 42 of his employees. The primary's employees struck and
induced a sister union at the secondary's plant to refuse to handle plates bound for the
primary. The court held the sympathy strike unlawful on the ground that the
secondary did not become an ally simply by agreeing to sell a new product to the
primary. But see text accompanying notes 69-74 infra.
52 This statement assumes that the primary employees do not respect the picket
line. Picketing by a union not representing the employees is legal for 30 days under
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (C) (1964), and for a longer period if a representation
petition under § 9(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1964), is filed.
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an alliance may be found although the work farmed out by the primary
to avoid the picketing is not ordinarily performed by the pickets.
In Madden v. Steel Fabricators Local 810 (Ideal Roller Co.),"
the court clearly recognized that the pickets need not be persons ordi-
narily performing the farmed-out struck work. The Ideal Roller em-
ployees striking the primary employer's Long Island plant also picketed
the company's Chicago plant and prevented the nonstriking Chicago
employees from working by turning away all truck deliveries. The
primary arranged for a Chicago warehouse company to accumulate the
truck shipments and then forward them to the Chicago plant in railroad
cars. When their picketing failed to prevent the railroad cars from
reaching the plant, the Long Island workers picketed the warehouse
company. The court held that even if none of the work done at the
warehouse would otherwise have been done by these pickets, the ware-
house was doing the primary's struck work and had made itself an
ally:
If Ideal's Chicago dock employees were on strike and
[the warehouse] was hired to do their work, it would be an
ally. It is equally so where, as here, some of the customary
activities of the dock employees are transferred to [the ware-
house] to avoid the impact of [the primary employees']
picketing. 4
The case stands for the propositions that a strike at the facility in-
volved is not a prerequisite to finding struck work, and that struck
work is not limited to work which the strikers themselves would per-
form but for the strike: the doctrine encompasses the primary em-
ployer's use of secondary employees to diminish the economic impact
of any concerted activity on his business. As the Ideal Roller court
concluded:
The "ally doctrine" exception to the prohibition of sec-
ondary boycotts is not limited to situations where the primary
employer is struck and employees of a secondary employer
engage in the work previously performed by the strikers. A
secondary employer is an "ally" and is engaged in "struck
work" when it performs services or work previously per-
formed by employees of a lawfully picketed plant even though
such employees are not on strike but are prevented from per-
forming such services or work by such lawful picketing.5
53 222 F. Supp. 635 (N.D. IIl. 1963).
54Id. at 638; accord, Teamsters Local 560 (Pennsylvania R.R.), 127 N.L.R.B.
1327, 1340, 1344-45 (1960) ; see Brown v. Amalgamated Lithographers Local 17, 180
F. Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1960) (strike or "other difficulty" sufficient).
'5 222 F. Supp. at 637. The Ninth Circuit's failure to articulate these principles
has caused confusion over its decision in NLRB v. Amalgamated Lithographers Local
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The consequences of failing to consider this range of interests pro-
tected by the struck work doctrine are illustrated by several storage
cases decided during the past decade. In McLeod v. Local 365, UAW
(Intertype Co.)," the primary immediately prior to the strike stored
nine completed linotype machines with the secondary for eventual ship-
ment to customers. The secondary had handled occasional transship-
ments for the primary but never so substantial a storage operation. The
primary employees induced the secondary's employees to refuse to
handle the crated machines, arguing that the machines were stored in
anticipation of the strike and that shipments made by the secondary
involved operations normally performed by the strikers. Confusing
cause and effect, the court stated that whether the storage occurred in
anticipation of the strike was relevant only if the secondary were the
primary's ally, disregarded Intertype's own storage operation by hold-
ing that the secondary performed no services normally performed by
Intertype, and granted an injunction on the ground that because the
primary employees had loaded the machines before the strike, when the
17, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The union
attempted to obtain a struck work clause providing that:
The Employers agree that they will not render assistance to any lithographic
employer any of whose plants is struck [by the union] . . . and accordingly
agree that in implementation of this purpose the employees covered by this
contract shall not be requested to handle any lithographic work . . . cus-
tomarily produced by such employer.
Id. at 36 n.6. The Board equated the second "employer" with "Employers" and
outlawed the clause as permitting employees of the signatory employers to refuse
work usually done for the struck primary by the signatory. Amalgamated Lithogra-
phers Local 17, 130 N.L.R.B. 985, 989 (1961), aff'd in part, 309 F.2d 31 (9th Cir.
1962). Attempting to implement the clause's clear intent, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that "such employer" must refer to the struck employer rather than to the signatories
and that:
As so read, the clause embodies only the ally doctrine. Employers are
to refrain from handling lithographic work "customarily produced by such
[struck] employer." This is the work which would be farmed out. They are
left free to perform work which the contracting employer normally does for
the struck employer.
309 F.2d at 38. The court set aside the Board's order insofar as it applied to this
clause.
Because the clause permitted not only refusals to perform the primary's struck
work but also refusals to handle goods the primary produced with strikebreakers or
delivered from inventory accumulated before the strike, this decision has been criticized
for overextending the ally doctrine. Note, Hot Cargo Agreements Under the National
Labor Relations Act: An Analysis of Section 8(e), 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 97, 122-23
(1963). With respect to goods produced by strikebreakers, the criticism is valid,
for the primary employees would have an adequate opportunity to appeal to the
strikebreakers at the primary's premises without interfering with the secondary's
business. With respect to goods produced before the strike and stored on the primary'spremises, it seems equally apt. The strikers can still reach both the nonstriking
employees performing the strikers' loading tasks and the deliverymen picking up the
inventory-traditional targets of primary strikes, e.g., United Steelworkers Union v.
NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 376 U.S. 492, 499 (1964)-without picketing the secondary.
But when goods produced by the striking employees before the strike are stored on
the secondary's premises, the loading activities of the secondary employees diminish
the strike's economic impact on the primary by enabling him to continue normal
delivery operations, and deprive the strikers of the opportunity to stop all deliveries.
Therefore the secondary should be reachable as an ally.
56200 F. Supp. 778 (E.D.N.Y. 1962) (§ 10(l) injunction).
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secondary duplicated this work by reloading them, it did not perform
struck work. 7 The reloading operation was not the work the strikers
would have performed but for the strike.
The Board's decision in Woodworkers Local 3-101 (Priest Log-
ging, Inc.) 5s eliminated the possibility that Intertype merely exemplified
a district court's reluctance to deny a section 10 (l) injunction when the
ally defense raised by the union broke new ground."9 In Priest Log-
ging, the primary sawmill, closed by the strike, hired a commercial
storage dump upriver to receive logs normally delivered directly to the
primary by Priest Logging. Priest could not be paid unless the
primary accepted its logs upon delivery somewhere. The mill's em-
ployees picketed the storage dump, claiming that the dump's unloaders
were doing work the strikers would have done had the logs come
directly to the mill and had there been no strike. The Trial Examiner
agreed.6" The Board, however, overruled him on the ground that
because the unloading would be repeated when the stored logs arrived
at the mill for processing after the strike, the secondary employees
merely duplicated the primary employees' labor. Thus the storage
operation neither deprived the primaries of any work nor furthered the
business interests of the primary.6' The Ninth Circuit expanded the
Board's holding by stating that because the primary employer's (sub-
stantial) storage operations were not sufficiently "essential" to its mill-
ing activities, the secondary storage did not provide the kind of
counterstrike benefit which would make the secondary an ally. The
court indicated that it would reach the same result even if the secondary
rafted the logs to the primary after the strike instead of trucking them,
although rafting would clearly supplant rather than duplicate the
strikers' normal work.62
571d. at 781. The argument that there was no showing that but for the strike
the machines would have been stored at Intertype was apparently not directly raised.
Eight days later the Second Circuit granted a rubberstamp enforcement order.
McLeod v. Local 365, UAW, 299 F2d 654 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
58137 N.L.R.B. 352 (1962).
59 See Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1410 & n.227.
60 137 N.L.R.B. at 360.
61 Id. at 354.
62 NLRB v. Woodworkers Local 3-101 (Priest Logging, Inc.), 319 F.2d 655,
657-58 (9th Cir. 1963). The court stated that secondary services diminishing the
impact of the strike on the primary were reachable only if they supplanted the strikers'
work "with the purpose and effect of enabling the primary employer to carry on its
usual operations during and not withstanding the strike." Id. at 657. The court
gave reasons neither for its determination that the primary's storage activities were
not "normal operations" nor for its requirement that the storage operation transferred
to the secondary substantially further the primary's basic production function. For
a reasoned rejection of this requirement, see Masters, Mates & Pilots Local 23
(Ingram Barge Co.), 136 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1962), discussed at text accompanying
notes 85-86 infra.
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Finally, in Teamsters Local 868 (Mercer Storage Co.),13 the
primary employer, an automobile dealer picketed by its salesmen, had all
cars consigned to it delivered to the secondary's warehouse to avoid
the pickets. By threatening to picket the warehouse, the striking sales-
men induced the secondary to refuse the cars. The Trial Examiner
reluctantly held that because handling the delivered cars-the work
performed by the secondary-was not work ordinarily done by the
salesmen, the inducement violated section 8(b) (4) (B) even though
the primary had farmed out its whole storage operation:
To be sure, the purpose and effect of storing Mid-County's
cars at Mercer was to avoid the impact of the lawful picketing
at Mid-County . . . . But under the present statute, as
authoritatively construed, these considerations do not amount
to legal justification for involving the neutral employer in a
labor controversy to which he is otherwise a stranger."
The Board adopted the Trial Examiner's conclusions without comment.
Intertype dealt with storage with a secondary of goods produced
by the primary employer while Priest Logging and Mercer Storage
involved storage with secondaries of goods bound for primaries, but
both approaches appear erroneous in contradicting the interpretation of
the struck work doctrine articulated in Ideal Roller. Passing over the
question of supplanted primary work raised in Priest Logging-doing
struck work even by that court's standards-if the criterion for alliance
is whether the secondary employees' labor is intended to reduce the
strike's impact on the primary's business, it is irrelevant that the work
performed by the secondary will be repeated by the primary's em-
ployees after the strike, if during the strike it enables the primary to
continue any aspect of his business unscathed. Particularly when the
work done by the secondary is essential to continuing the primary's
business-for instance, the deliveries in Priest Logging enabling the
logging contractor to be paid and continue operations during the
strike-the work should be labelled struck work and the ally defense
allowed. The secondary also "inevitably tend [s] to break the strike" 0'
when, as in Intertype, it duplicates work ordinarily done by the primary
employees after rather than before their performance, because in either
case the transfer of the delivery function deprives the striking primary
employees of a fair chance to picket those doing their work. In addi-
63 156 N.L.R.B. 67 (1965).
64 1d. at 70 (citing NLRB v. Woodworkers Local 3-101 (Priest Logging, Inc.),
319 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1963)); accord, Vincent v. Chemical Workers Local 61
(Sterling Drug Co.), 75 L.R.R.M. 2496 (W.D.N.Y. 1970) (§ 10(1) injunction).
65NLRB v. Business Mach. Mech. Local 459 (Royal Typewriter Co.), 228 F2d
553, 558 (2d Cir. 1955).
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tion, a holding such as Intertype's undercuts industrial peace because
the primary employees' knowledge that excess production might be
used against them in a strike could easily result in a permanent slow-
down designed to prevent inventory from accumulating. Such slow-
downs will seldom occur if the primaries know that, in the event of a
strike, they may picket as a primary any secondary providing storage
which helps the primary employer to avoid the strike's effect.
The anomalous results produced by such narrow reliance on exact
duplication by the secondary of the primary employees' work are amply
illustrated by the Mercer Storage case. The Trial Examiner in that
case would have accepted the ally defense if a sympathy walkout by
the primary employees actually handling the car deliveries had fortu-
itously occurred. Yet the relevant question is not whether the
secondary employees do the work of striking or nonstriking primary
workers, but whether diverting work to the secondary helps the primary
employer to evade any economic pressure exerted by the strike.
These cases seem to embody an unarticulated feeling that injecting
the struck work doctrine into secondary storage situations creates
special problems. In Priest Logging, for instance, the court offered no
justification for its conclusion that storage was not part of the primary
sawmill's normal business. The line between "primary" sawmilling
and "incidental" storage was apparently drawn for fear that treating
the storer as an ally would endanger the secondary's right to continue
his ordinary business relations with the struck primary. Such fears
seem unwarranted, for a rule that secondaries will be treated as allies
only when the storage activity significantly increases because of the
strike, involves work normally performed by primary employees, and
purposefully enables the primary to carry on a segment of his business
would adequately protect the contending interests. If it is felt that
application of the ally doctrine in this area would unduly restrict the
primary's normal business opportunities by confronting the potential
secondary with the threat of a full strike whenever the primary workers
think he is doing struck work, the doctrine might be narrowed in
secondary storage cases by eliminating its "in the shoes" aspect and
permitting only picketing limited to inducing secondary employees to
refuse to handle the goods specifically involved in the strike-precisely
the situation in Intertype and Mercer Storage.66
The justification for this possible distinction between ordinary
farming out and secondary storage turns on the degree to which the
66 Because of the possible difficulties attending partial work stoppages, text
accompanying notes 45-46 supra, this modification might have to be implemented
legislatively rather than through the judicial or administrative process. If the pri-
mary's main business were storage, this protective distinction would, of course, not
apply.
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primary employer's action in contracting with a secondary resembles
strikebreaking. The primary employer's action in Priest Logging, for
instance, is significantly less like strikebreaking than hiring another
sawmill to cut and sell its lumber. Correspondingly, to the extent that
the secondary is not helping the primary break the strike, his claim to
immunity from picketing has more merit. In this balancing sense, the
Priest Logging court's distinction between farming out primary pro-
duction and farming out activities incidental thereto does have rele-
vance, but this test should not be used to deny primary workers all
chance of reaching those displacing them. A limited rule, incorporating
safeguards permitting the "in the shoes" doctrine to reapply if the
secondary shows bad faith, would leave the primary and secondary free
to conclude whatever non-struck-work business arrangements they
desire, subject only to the liability deliberate farming out must entail.
Indeed, the Board's General Counsel appears to have begun the
line of storage cases by endorsing this view. In a 1960 administrative
ruling,6" he refused to issue a complaint when the primary employer
arranged for a secondary to receive goods carried by a deliveryman
turned away by pickets from the primary's gate, and the pickets fol-
lowed the deliveryman to the secondary's premises to prevent him from
unloading there. The summary of the ruling explained that the picket-
ing was permissible because the primary "sought to make [the sec-
ondary] its ally in [the] primary dispute by arranging for [the sec-
ondary] -to serve as temporary receiving depot for merchandise which,
except for [the] dispute, would have been delivered directly to [the pri-
mary]" 5-sa situation identical to Priest Logging and Mercer Storage.
But those decisions intervened, and a similar instance has not since
been reported.
C. What Is Struck Work?: Motive and Intent
Different questions of a more evidentiary nature arise when the
problem is not whether the secondary employees are performing the
strikers' work, but whether that work was intentionally transferred to
avoid the impact of the primary dispute. In Brewery Workers Local 8
(Bert P. Williams, Inc.),"9 a case encapsulating the issues involved in
this problem, the primary employer, O'Brien, operated an exclusive
franchise obligating it to solicit, sell, and deliver beer. Although
O'Brien had once subcontracted the franchise's delivery responsibility,
for the past twenty years all deliveries had been made by primary em-
67 Administrative Ruling of the General Counsel, Case No. SR-717, 46 L.R.R.M.
1492 (1960).
68 Id.
69 148 N.L.R.B. 728 (1964).
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ployees represented by the union. Because the delivery service was
losing money, O'Brien considered resuming the subcontracting pro-
cedure, and notified the union in late December that he would allow
their current contract to expire on March 1. Simultaneously, O'Brien
commenced negotiations with Williams, an independent deliveryman.
In January he began parallel contract negotiations with the union, but
withdrew from the latter negotiations when Williams submitted a
favorable written proposal on February 15. Williams and O'Brien
reached an unofficial agreement in late February and on March 7 signed
a binding contract, six days after the primary employees voted to strike.
Once the new delivery arrangement became public, the strikers picketed
Williams' trucks as well as O'Brien's premises.
O'Brien argued that Williams would have received the contract
for economic reasons regardless of the strike. Emphasizing that
O'Brien held lengthy prestrike negotiations with Williams and that
Williams' contract ran for two years rather than for the strike's dura-
tion, the Trial Examiner agreed that even though the strike preceded
the execution of the contract, it did not motivate O'Brien to subcontract
the delivery operation.70  The Board recited a plethora of facts char-
acteristic of situations in which it had found no alliance 71 and reversed,
holding that the contract's duration could not be used to determine
motive because such a test would facilitate employers' attempts to
evade the struck work rule.
It may be, of course, that sometime in the future O'Brien
might have contracted out its delivery work, but the decision
to contract out coincidentally with the strike was, we hold,
caused by the failure or imminent failure of collective-bargain-
ing negotiations with Respondent and represented an attempt
by O'Brien to insure continuance of beer deliveries notwith-
standing the strike by its own employees. 72
Member Leedom dissented because he believed that an equally valid
inference was that the subcontracting, which was justified by the
economic data, caused the strike rather than vice versa, and that the
contract was made "close in time" to the strike because O'Brien could
70 1d. at 742-43.
71 These included: taking over the same function performed by the striking unit;
hiring the drivers who had performed that function for the primary; the secondary's
lack of significant capital investment; the temporary leasing of the trucks previously
used by the primary; and the primary's exercise of supervision over the subcontracted
operation. Id. at 730-31; see Teamsters Local 25 (J. C. Driscoll Transp., Inc.),
148 N.L.R.B. 845 (1964); Teamsters Local 107 (Riss & Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 943
(1961), enforced, 300 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1962).
72 148 N.L.R.B. at 733 (alternate holding). The court also found the picketing
to be legitimate activity because the delivery trucks, now leased by Williams, re-
mained the situs of the dispute. Id. at 734; see Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore
Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547, 549 (1950).
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not conclude it until he knew the union would not meet his terms. 73 To
make the juxtaposition of strike and subcontract a presumption of
alliance would force primary employers desiring to subcontract for
legitimate business reasons to do so before the end of the collective
bargaining term, thus limiting the union's opportunity to persuade the
employer that it could meet his demands.74
Insofar as Williams merely erects a rebuttable presumption of
alliance, its holding is justified by the need to protect the right to strike
from employer evasions camouflaged beneath multiple goals. More-
over, although all subcontracting which might diminish the impact of a
future strike cannot be held to make the secondary an ally without
eliminating independent subcontractors, and although subcontracting
specifically to avoid a legitimate strike cannot be protected, a broad
spectrum exists between these two extremes. If only because the
primary has better access to evidence of his intent, the burden of proving
that the subcontract would have been made regardless of the strike
threat should probably shift to him when a strike is imminent or
reasonably foreseeable, since at these points suspicion falls most heavily
on the primary anyway.
But insofar as Williams generates a rigid rule 75 that making sub-
contracts after a strike becomes reasonably foreseeable proves an intent
to evade a strike, it contradicts the Board's earlier flexibility in this
area.71 Subcontracts may be made even after the strike begins without
intending to evade it, and to deny employers the chance to show that
the contract would have been made in any case may cripple an em-
ployer's ability to conduct a viable business. Furthermore, the corollary
of the Williams rule is plainly false: subcontracts made long before or
after the primary dispute begins may still be designed to evade its
impact, and to hold them protected by an acceptable intent inferred from
the date of their making would create an exception capable of swallow-
ing the struck work rule.
The dangers of relying on a per se rule linked to the time of
contracting, especially in precipitous temporary injunction proceedings,
are demonstrated by Cuneo v. Newspaper Deliverers of New York.
77
The unionized employees of the Morning Call's distributor were en-
73 148 N.L.R.B. at 735-36.
74 Id. at 738 n.15.
75 For a mechanical application of this timing principle prior to its recognition
in Williams, see Administrative Ruling of the General Counsel, Case No. SR-2053,
50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962).
76 For an example of the Board's earlier flexibility, see Plumbers & Pipe Fitters
Local 35 (Richard E. Buettner), 126 N.L.R.B. 708 (1960) (inference of intent to
evade dispute rebutted by showing that primary never performed the work it sub-
contracted and had been advised not to undertake it).
77 69 L.R.R.M. 2880 (D.N.J. 1968) (§ 10(l) injunction).
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gaged in a lawful dispute with the Morning Call, a daily newspaper
which they had distributed. A year after the strike's inception, Bergen,
which shared common officers, directors, stockholders, and facilities
with the Morning Call, began publishing the Sunday Record Call in
addition to its evening newspaper. Arguing that the Morning Call
would have published and distributed the new paper but for the strike,
the primary employees induced Bergen's independent distributors to
refuse to handle the Sunday Record Call. The district court granted
an injunction halting the union's activity after simply concluding that
no struck work was involved because the striking employees failed to
show that but for the strike the Morning Call would have published
and distributed the new paper, without considering whether the burden
of proof on this issue might have shifted to the publisher even on the
sparse facts given in its opinion.
78
Cuneo appears to rest on the starting date for the new paper, one
year after the strike began. But the time at which the work shifted
cannot be conclusive, because it may simply have marked the point at
which the primary strike began to hurt the Morning Call. Further-
more, the case's implicit conclusion that the Call would have transferred
the disputed work anyway represents an ultimate factual inference
which must be grounded on stated intermediate inferences if it is not
to be totally subjective. The court, however, never investigated
whether sound economic reasons justified the transfer, whether plans
for the transfer predated the time at which the strike became foreseeable,
and whether the Call was equipped to publish a similar paper or had
previously done so. It thereby made timing conclusive proof of the
primary's intent rather than treating it as relevant evidence of intent, 70
though the publication and distribution by Bergen plainly diminished
the strike's effect on the primary.
D. Secondary Self-Help: The Necessity of an Arrangement
Another early caveat to the formula that a secondary's performance
of strikers' work creates an alliance developed in cases of secondary
self-help. As the Trial Examiner noted in the leading case in this area,
Longshoremen's Local 333 (New York Shipping Association), °
7 8 In his concurring opinion in Royal Typewriter, Judge Hand noted that:
When, however, a secondary employer accepts business for which the primary
employer pays him, although it is not an inevitable inference that, but for
the strike, the primary employer would have done the business himself, I see
no reason why he should not be compelled to prove that the primary employer
would not have done it, if he could have.
228 F2d at 562.
79 The Board later reached the same result on fuller facts without specifically
mentioning the timing of the transfer. Newspaper Deliverers of New York (Bergen
Evening Record Corp.), 175 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 70 L.R.R.M. 1590 (1969).
80 107 N.L.R.B. 686 (1954).
1970]
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[secondary] employers by seeking to accommodate their
operations to the strike situation [do not necessarily make]
themselves allies in interest with struck employers ....
A secondary employer faced with a strike against his supplier
of services is not obliged to sit idly by lest he forfeit his status
as a neutral; he may, without risking the protection Section
8(b) (4) [(B)] accords him . . . , seek other suppliers,
devise other methods, and employ other means to enable him
to continue his business on as nearly normal a level as
possible."'
In New York Shipping, employees of harbor tugboat operators
struck, forcing the tugs to suspend operations. The pier operators, who
normally relied on the tugs to dock arriving ships, used their own em-
ployees to pull the ships in with cables, hand over hand. When the
tugboat employees picketed the pier operators for performing tasks the
struck tugs would do but for the strike, the Trial Examiner found that
the work done by the secondary's employees, although technically struck
work, was not done for the primaries and did not "enure to their bene-
fit," 82 and refused to hold the pier operators and primary employers
allied.
Precise definition of "benefit to the primary" plays a crucial role
in distinguishing New York Shipping from ordinary struck work cases,
for the pier operators' improvisation did benefit the primary employers
to the extent that the secondary operators were no lofiger deprived of
necessary services and consequently would not pressure the primary to
settle too quickly. Yet the right to subject secondary employers to
direct pressure to force a primary settlement is precisely the right denied
strikers by section 8(b) (4) (B). Insofar as the secondary employees'
performance reduced the impact of the strike only on the secondary em-
ployers, the primary employers did not benefit. If anything, that per-
formance was detrimental to the primary employers because the
secondaries might have decided to continue using their experimental
method after the strike."3
The holding in New York Shipping stands for two related propo-
sitions: (1) Secondary employers may use any means to reduce the
impact of the strike on their businesses as long as they do not directly
81 Id. at 708. The case involved substitute services performed by the primary's
customers, but the customers might also have contracted with other secondaries for
the services. The following discussion concentrates on the latter but assumes both
possibilities.
82 Id. at 708.
83 The pier operators were unlikely to continue to dock and move ships by hand
after the strike, but they had also hired truckers to transfer freight between piers-
a task formerly performed by the struck harbor craft-creating a more significant
risk of a permanent transfer. See id. at 699.
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reduce the impact of the strike on the primary employer by enabling
him to continue his business. (2) No alliance exists between the struck
primary and the substitute servicer when the impetus for the arrange-
ment by which the substitute services are provided to the primary's
customers comes solely from those customers, and the services are not
undertaken for the primary's account or in his name. There must be
an arrangement between the primary and the substitute servicer, as well
as primary-type services furnished to the primary's market, before the
substitute servicer can be reached by the striking primary employees.
On the other hand, the secondary customer's need for primary-type
services to continue his business will not necessarily exempt him from
union pressure if in quest of self-help he incidentally creates an arrange-
ment.8 4 In Masters, Mates & Pilots Local 28 (Ingram Barge Co.),"
striking employees of the primary barge company were replaced by
scabs who performed the strikers' loading operations at Texaco's dock.
The strikers picketed the Texaco dock while the scab-manned barges
were loading there, and the barge company withdrew the scab crew,
leaving the barges to be loaded by Texaco employees. When the picket-
ing continued, the General Counsel sought to halt it by expanding the
argument used in New York Shipping: Texaco's loading of Ingram's
barges was merely the exercise of secondary self-help to continue its
own business. Furthermore, because the striking barge workers' load-
ing responsibilities were incidental to their central transportation func-
tion, any struck work was de minimus and should not outweigh the
secondary's right to insulate itself from the effects of the primary dis-
pute. The Board, however, flatly stated that if the transferred work
benefited the primary, its incidental nature was irrelevant, and held
that when the work transferred was essential to the primary's opera-
tions and secondary employees performed it under the secondary em-
ployer's direction, an arrangement with the secondary would be pre-
sumed to exist if he did not normally direct the operations. Because
the loading was necessary to the continuation of the primary's opera-
tions as well as the secondary's, permitting the secondary to perform
the loading would deprive the strikers of one of their few significant
opportunities to reach those doing their work. As the Board explained:
The significant fact is that the loading operations in this case
could not have proceeded without performance of the duties
84 See, e.g., Teamsters Local 901 (Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B.
895, 907 (1961).
855136 N.L.R.B. 1175 (1962), enforced, 321 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The
Ingran Barge problems were implicit in NLRB v. Operating Engineers Local 571
(Layne-Western Drilling Co.), 317 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1963). but the Layne-Western
court ignored these issues in deciding its case on more superficial grounds. Compare
id. at 643, with, e.g., Teamsters Local 901 (Editorial "El Imparcial," Inc.), 134
N.L.R.B. 895, 907 (1961).
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regularly carried out by Ingram's employees and that Texas
employees were directed to take them over pursuant to an
understanding between their employer and Ingram.
. . . Th[e] privilege of self-help . . . is not an unquali-
fied authorization to a secondary employer to perform with its
employees the struck work of its supplier of services, on the
struck employer's equipment, and by arrangement with that
employer.8 8
Texaco could have hired other barges or shifted to tank trucks, but
staffing Ingram's barges with Texaco employees to perform a function
vital to Ingram's business as well as Texaco's enabled Ingram to evade
the effects of the primary strike.
Standing at the intersection of the right to self-help and the right
to strike is Local 333, NMIU (D.M. Picton) . Picton and Sabine
were the only commercial towing companies in the relevant geographic
market, and local secondary employers customarily rotated their busi-
ness between the two. When Sabine's employees struck, Sabine shut
down and sent an open letter to its customers advising that Picton
would be available during the strike. Picton declared that it would not
handle any of Sabine's work pending settlement of the strike and re-
fused to tow any vessel owned by or under contract with Sabine.
Nevertheless, its business increased dramatically as the market it shared
with Sabine became a temporary monopoly. The primary employees
picketed every second boat towed by Picton on the theory that half of
the tows would have been Sabine's under the rotation system but for
the strike.
Because Sabine and its customers knew that, given the market
structure, Picton had to do Sabine's normal work and that Sabine
would return the favor if Picton were struck, any shutdown by Sabine
automatically created "an arrangement." In this sense Sabine's letter
and Picton's disclaimer were irrelevant because the transfer would
have occurred even in their absence."" On the other hand, unlike the
situation in Ingram Barge, the secondaries dependent on Sabine for
towing had no alternative but to switch to Picton, and to hold that
Picton was the primary's ally-by the de facto arrangement resulting
from this fortuitous market structure would deprive the customers of
their only significant opportunity for self-help. Moreover, in one sense
88 136 N.L.R.B. at 1187-88.
87 131 N.L.R.B. 693 (1961).
88 That Sabine was Picton's direct competitor was similarly irrelevant because
they were also oligopolists and Sabine was certain to regain its share of the business
after the strike. The independents performing repair services in Royal Typewriter
were Royal's competitors, yet they were held to be allies as well. See text accom-
panying notes 20-28 supra.
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at least, no arrangement existed: Picton worked not for Sabine but for
Sabine's customers. The services were rendered in Picton's name, not
Sabine's, and even if Picton's towing reduced the economic impact of
the strike on the customers, Sabine did not benefit in any economic
sense as long as it remained closed.
Although the last arguments may also be advanced in defense of
"back-scratching" arrangements by which parties agree to take up
the slack caused by a strike against either, it is at this point of deadlock
between the right to strike and the right to secondary self-help-and
only at this point-that good faith enters the picture. By refusing to
handle all the work Sabine was contractually obligated to perform,
Picton did all that could reasonably be asked of a secondary desiring
to remain neutral consonant with the right of Sabine's customers not
to have to shut down all operations dependent on towing. The primary
employees' right to exert full economic pressure on their employer is
largely preserved when the challenged secondary's actions exhibit a
bona fide intent not to interfere in the dispute, and that right should
give way at its edges when the failure to do so will cause avoidable and
disproportionate harm to secondary customers not directly involved.
The Board in effect so held in Picton.s
E. Secondary Self-Help: Conduit Farming Out
The clash between secondary self-help and the right to strike
evidenced in Picton may be carried a step farther. In Pipefitters Local
638 (Consolidated Edison Co.),"0 the primary employer, Courter,
received a general contract for the fabrication and installation of piping
in Consolidated Edison's new power plant. The contract contained a
clause authorizing the owner to withdraw from the contract, and to
reassign, piping not installed according to schedule. Courter's contract
with the Pipefitters required that all pipe fabrication preceding in-
stallation be performed by Courter employees either at the jobsite or
in Courter's shops. When Courter subcontracted the fabrication of
89 Although it would seem clear that Picton and the customers were not
wholly innocent in the matter in that they clearly knew that Picton was
performing some work at least that Sabine would have performed . . . a
customer arranging for substitute services during a strike does not make
himself or the substitute an "ally" merely because he knowingly arranges
for services and the substitute knowingly performs them. In the absence
of a direct or indirect arrangement by the struck employer with the customer
or secondary employer (Picton) to have the work performed for its account,
the secondary employers do not lose the protection afforded a "neutral"
under the Act. This may appear, from an economic point of view, an
illogical and, indeed, arbitrary drawing of a line, but the line has to be
drawn somewhere . . ..
131 N.L.R.B. at 699; accord, Teamsters Local 806 (Ada Transit Mix), 130 N.L.R.B.
788 (1961).
90 124 N.L.R.B. 521 (1959).
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some of the piping, its employees refused to install this piping, causing
Courter to fall behind schedule. Consolidated Edison then asked
Courter to designate the piping furthest behind schedule and trans-
ferred that fabrication to a second subcontractor, Midwest, without
consulting Courter on its choice. Courter's workmen again refused to
install the pipe, arguing that it was not fabricated according to the
terms of the union's contract. The Board held that the second refusal
violated section 8(b) (4) (B), adopting the Trial Examiner's finding
that because the owner was solely concerned with the construction
delays caused by the first refusal and suffered a 12,000 dollar loss from
the transfer, that transfer was not made "in Courter's behalf," "' and
the union had failed to prove a Courter-Midwest alliance. 2
The Second Circuit enforced with the somewhat unsatisfactory
explanation that because Courter had had no direct business dealings
with Midwest and no longer controlled the fabrication work, it could
not have farmed out that work.
True, [Courter] informed Edison that it could not perform
on schedule, thus paving the way for Edison to exercise its
contractual privilege of withdrawing work from Courter. But
the evidence stands uncontroverted that Edison gave the work
to Midwest without the advice or knowledge of Courter. To
bring these facts within the Ebasco-Royal doctrine would re-
quire a holding that Edison was somehow Courter's agent,
a holding that would fly in the face of reality.9 3
But the question Consolidated Edison raises is precisely whether the
owner should be treated as the general contractor's agent in such situa-
tions-whether the owner is merely a conduit through which the
primary employer accomplishes by contract the farming out it could
not arrange openly, and whether this result should not be prevented
by a prophylactic rule permitting the strikers to picket secondaries
knowingly engaged by conduit employers to perform farmed-out work.
Arguments attacking three of the premises of the Consolidated
Edison holding militate for a prophylactic rule of this nature. The
Consolidated Edison court appeared to assume that applying economic
pressure against a primary employer lacking legal power to reassign
the disputed work was per se unlawful. In this respect the decision
9 1 Id. at 526.
9
2 Id. at 527.
93 NLRB v. Pipefitters Local 638, 285 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1960); ef.
Springfield Bldg. Trades Council (Spear Constr. Co.), 120 N.L.R.B. 600, enforced,
262 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1958); Seafarers Int'l Union (Gulf & Caribbean Towing
Co.), 125 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1032-34 (1959), in which the struck primary chartered a
tug to B to haul for C, and the strikers unsuccessfully argued that C controlled B
and used B to disguise hauling which would otherwise have been done by the
primary.
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seems open to question because the "right to control" concept has been
discredited for permitting primary employers to negate their workers'
right to strike simply by ceding control to another employer 94-argu-
ably the situation in Consolidated Edison. To the extent the opinion
assumed that the owner's engagement of Midwest was not Courter's,
it seems similarly questionable. 5  Because the piping most likely to
fall behind schedule would plainly be that delayed by a Courter labor
dispute, the contract pursuant to which the transfer was accomplished
can be read as requiring Courter to let Consolidated Edison farm out
its struck work-palpable evidence of the two parties' strikebreaking
intent." The primary's nonparticipation in the selection process is
irrelevant, since the only purpose in allowing withdrawal under the
general contract was to permit transfer to some secondary, and an
undesignated secondary can provide a strikebreaking force as effectively
as one chosen by the primary. And the owner's understandable desire
to avoid delays is equally irrelevant when the means used to maintain
his schedule enable the primary to continue furnishing the very services
which are the subject of dispute.
The Consolidated Edison court further assumed that the owner
could seek self-help in this manner without jeopardizing his neutrality,
although his right to self-help differs from that of Picton's customers
in at least two ways. Not only did the owner fail to make any good
faith effort to avoid infringing upon the primary workers' right to
strike,9 7 but the lack of other "nonarrangement" sources of primary-
type services resulted from his own actions rather than impersonal
market conditions. By hiring the general contractor, the owner saddled
himself with the effects of the general's labor disputes, insofar as the
only way to avoid those effects also helped the general to avoid them.
If the general were a monopoly shut down by the primary strike, the
owner would have to absorb the losses caused by the unavailability of
the primary's services and could legally be bankrupted by the losses.98
94 See, e.g., Plumbers Local 636 v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906, 910 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
and cases cited therein; American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 556 (8th
Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Electrical Workers Local 164, 388 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1968).
95The argument that the primary employer should have the burden of proving
nonalliance if work is transferred when a strike is reasonably foreseeable, see text
accompanying notes 74-78 supra, is even more compelling when, as here, the strikers
have a contractual right to the work and the strike is the direct result of the transfer.
96This reading is particularly persuasive in light of the union's additional argu-
ment that Courter's original contract price to Consolidated Edison was so low that
it necessarily contemplated breaking the union contract. 285 F2d at 645.
97 Appropriate efforts might have included asking Courter to continue only those
installations not requiring the disputed pipe, or reassigning the disputed fabrication
work to Courter's own employees under the contract.
Ss As one commentator has noted:
Almost every strike causes economic loss to one or more employers who
are unconcerned with the labor dispute. A coal distributor may go bankrupt
because of a coal strike. A small steel fabricator may be forced to close
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By contracting all its piping to the general contractor, the owner made
the general a monopoly for this construction project, and the same
result should obtain.
These arguments suggest that whenever employers in Consolidated
Edison's position, aware of the primary employer's labor dispute, en-
gage secondary employers to do work which would otherwise be done
by the strikers, they are acting as conduits by which the primary em-
ployer farms out his struck work, and secondaries so engaged may be
reached as the primary's allies. The opposite holding would undermine
the struck work doctrine for the same reasons discrediting the right to
control rule, and produce results as anomalous as that in the instant
case in which primary employees were denied the right to pressure an
employer who had blatantly breached his contract with them.
All such arguments for a prophylactic rule founder, however, on
the basics of the struck work doctrine-the nature of the "benefit to
the primary" required, the need for an arrangement, and the necessity
of preserving self-help opportunities for affected secondaries. Thus,
the primary "benefited" when Consolidated Edison transferred the
disputed fabrication only because the Board found that its employees'
partial work stoppage was an unfair labor practice; if the Board had
not intervened, the transfer would not have helped Courter weather its
strike at all because-unlike the situation in Ingram Barge-the
Courter employees could have continued to refuse to install the piping
fabricated by Midwest. Even apart from the Board's intervention, the
transfer did not aid Courter because he lost his profit on the fabrica-
tion." Finally, to hold, as the prophylactic argument urges, that Mid-
west and Consolidated Edison were Courter's allies because of the
withdrawal clause is to hold not merely that the primary employees
could refuse to handle piping fabricated by Midwest, but that they
could picket Midwest and Consolidated Edison as well-a holding that
would effectively eliminate the owner's chances for self-help. The in-
consistency of this position is revealed by a variation on the facts in
Consolidated Edison. If the owner engages two general contractors
and reassigns one's work to the other when the first falls victim to a
dispute-a situation indistinguishable from Picton-the prophylactic
rule would permit the primary employees to picket the second con-
his doors because of a major steel strike. Such economic losses as these
far ouweigh the losses caused by secondary boycotts. Yet Congress has not
sought to aid these neutrals. . . . [Wlhile harm to a neutral is an essen ial
ingredient of a secondary boycott, such injury is not by itself objectionable
in the eyes of the legislature.
Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 732 (1951) (emphasis
added). See also National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. ILRB, 386 U.S. 612, 627
(1967) (dictum).
9 124 N.L.R.B. at 525.
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tractor, erasing Picton's beneficially balanced result. Without some
direct proof of an arrangement between the general contractor and
Midwest, the blanket application of a prophylactic rule exposing the
owner and Midwest to picketing would deny incidental secondaries the
opportunity to avoid the full impact of the primary dispute, and promote
the economic dislocation Congress intended section 8(b) (4) (B) to
prevent.
The central problem in Consolidated Edison is therefore not the
primary employees' inability to pressure the owner or Midwest, but that
they were prevented from pressuring the employer who had breached
his contract with them. Their complaint clearly involves the preserva-
tion of work guaranteed them under the existing contract-a claim
better handled by allowing them to refuse to install the products of
work farmed out in violation of that contract while preserving self-help
for those incidentally affected by such refusals.' 0 Unnecessary and
drastic revisions of the rights balanced by the secondary boycott section
under which their original protest was halted would thereby be avoided.
F. Conclusions: Farmed-Out Struck Work
The classic formulation of the struck work doctrine-that a second-
ary employer's performance of work which the primary employees would
do but for their strike permits those employees to picket his establish-
ment despite the statutory prohibition against secondary boycotts-
inadequately explains many of the cases decided under this rubric. The
doctrine evolved to prevent employers from evading strikes by continu-
ing to do business through others. Throughout its development, pro-
tection of employees' traditional right to exert a full complement of
economic pressure against their employer to improve their working
conditions has remained paramount, and this rationale often outruns
the classic formula. Thus a strike at the facility farming out work
is not a prerequisite to finding the secondary accepting it to be allied
on struck work grounds. When an outside union seeking recognition
pickets the original facility, for instance, the transfer of work to another
location reduces the picketers' traditional opportunity to appeal to those
entering the premises of the employer with whom they have a dispute.
Nor need struck work be the precise tasks done by the strikers because
even when the work transferred is usually done by nonstrikers, re-
moving it to another location reduces the strikers' chance to exert
economic presure below that which would be present were the work
performed at the primary site.
100 E.g.. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB. 386 U.S. 612. 642-46 (1967)
(on-site refusal to handle prefabricated material displacing refusers' normal work is
lawful primary activity).
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For the doctrine to apply, there need be only a direct or indirect
arrangement between the secondary and the primary, a "benefit" to the
primary diminishing the impact of lawful pressure on some aspect of
his business, and a finding that the work performed by the secondary
employees cannot be picketed at the primary premises to the extent it
could be if it were all done there. If the primary workers can adequately
appeal to the secondary employees at the primary premises in the course
of activities comparable to strikebreaking, the doctrine should not be
invoked because the right it protects is not undermined, even when
those to whom the pickets appeal refuse to listen. The right to strike
does not incorporate a right to a successful strike: a primary employer
threatened by a work stoppage or a secondary confronted by his sup-
plier's strike are not obliged to cease production. They may use any
means to carry on their businesses and to prevent the spread of the
dispute's dislocating effects. The struck work doctrine does not gain-
say this; it merely permits the union to appeal to secondary employees
used to replace striking primaries, if the union cannot adequately picket
their strikebreaking activities at the primary site.
II. SINGLE ENTERPRISES
After Ebasco, other problems arose if the decision's second ground
-the interrelatedness deriving from the participation of Project em-
ployees in Ebasco's "unified and integrated production effort" "I-'-
sufficed to make the secondary "concerned" in the primary's labor
dispute. What evidence justifies the conclusion that secondary em-
ployees are "acting as a part of" 102 the primary employer's enterprise?
If the primary purchases an essential component of his only product
exclusively from the secondary under a long-term requirements contract,
are the secondary's employees part of a single enterprise with the pri-
mary because they effectively work for him? Ebasco exercised continu-
ous supervision over the Project employees doing its work. Had it
retained this supervisory power without exercising it, would the result
have been different? Although merely retaining the power makes the
primary the secondary workers' employer in a representation proceed-
ing,10 3 perhaps actual control should be required before subjecting the
secondary to picketing when no representation issue has been raised.
10195 CONG. REC. 8709 (1949) (remarks of Senator Ives).
102Id. (remarks of Senator Taft).
10 3See NLRA §§8(a)(5), 9 (c), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 15 9(c) (1964); cf.
Insurance Agents' Int'l Union (Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.), 118 N.L.R.B.
412, 414-15 (1957) (§ 9 (c) petition) ; Teamsters Local 389 (National Van Lines),
117 N.L.R.B. 1213, 1219-20 (1957) (§9(c) petition).
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Ebasco's struck work aspect depended upon a clearly definable act
by which the secondary involved himself in the dispute. But the single
enterprise concept allowed the same question of the permissibility of
picketing to turn on an ambiguous status rather than an act, and
threatened to force secondaries to limit their business dealings radically
to avoid being held part of some struck customer's enterprise. More-
over, the clear implication of holding that secondary workers controlled
by a primary employer are picketable is that his control of the secondary
employer will also make them picketable, because in both situations the
primary determines the employment conditions of the secondary workers
as well as his own. Here the problems resulting from the single enter-
prise concept became nightmares. Judge Learned Hand early held that,
in the absence of struck work, the "business" protected by section 8(b)
(4) (B) included any business the secondary employer could freely
discontinue, even if the price were a suit for breach of contract.' Did
this mean that the secondary is "part of the primary" only when the
primary so controls the secondary's business decisions that the second-
ary cannot withdraw without the primary's consent? If the primary is
a monopsonist able to dictate the terms on which he purchases from his
secondary supplier, would the secondary then be "concerned"? ... Is
common ownership providing potential control of the secondary equiva-
lent to actual control? The general yardstick for determining whether
primary and secondary employers were part of a single enterprise was
plainly whether protecting the secondary would unduly limit the right
of the primary employees to strike their employer. But this test could
not be used to decide concrete cases without introducing an arbitrary
element of personal preference. The need for objective standards was
acute.
A. Basic Doctrine
Although the Board waited ten years before applying the struck
work doctrine stemming from the Ebasco case, it exhibited no such
104 Electrical Workers Local 501 v. NLRB (Langer), 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1950), enforcing 82 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1949), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
105 For an interesting variation on this argument suggesting that if the primary
is a monopolist-oligopolist or is engaged in a horizontally organized industry in
which a union success against one employer will inevitably be followed by similar
demands on others, the primary's customers will not be "wholly unconcerned" because
the increased labor costs will be passed on to them, and the horizontal competitors
will not be "wholly unconcerned" because the surrender of one means the defeat of
all, see Borus & Warshal, Neutrality and Secondary Boycotts: An Economic Evalua-
tion of a Legal Question, 17 LAB. L.J. 310 (1966). The argument could logically
be extended to apply to vertically organized industries and to industries characterized
by a "leapfrog" pattern of bargaining. The courts, of course, have not accepted
this argument, see, e.g., Carpenters Dist. Council (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81
N.L.R.B. 802, 805-07 (1949), enforced, 184 F2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 947 (1951), and probably should not as long as rules more attuned to the
specific interests the Act protects can be developed. The argument illustrates, how-
ever, the sometimes desperate quest for standards in this field.
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hesitancy about the single enterprise concept. In Marine Cooks and
Stewards Union (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.),1°6 decided barely a year
after Ebasco, the Board held almost without discussion that when two
separate but commonly owned and controlled corporations engaged in a
"straight line operation," the second corporation was not "wholly un-
concerned" in the first's labor disputes and could lawfully be picketed
although neither common supervision nor a transfer of struck work
occurred. The Boom Company, the sole licensed common carrier on
the Coos River, shared common stockholders and principal officers with
the Lumber Company. When the primary workers struck the Lumber
Company, they also picketed the Boom Company's separate premises,
inducing the latter's employees to stop work. Finding no violation of
the secondary boycott provision, the Trial Examiner noted that because
lumber production could only take place if the Boom Company trans-
ported logs from the Lumber Company's timberland to its mill, the
Boom Company functioned as "a necessary adjunct" of the primary's
business and "constituted but a phase" of a single economic enterprise
producing finished planks."' The Board affirmed, accepting the deter-
mination that the companies were "engaged in 'one straight line
operation'." "08
Insofar as the "straight line" test rested on Senator Taft's expla-
nation of the secondary boycott provision 10. that employers standing in
a jobber-contractor relationship in which the latter acted as the former's
production arm were not protected from each other's labor disputes, the
test seemed crucial to the finding that the strikers' picketing of the Boom
Company was lawful. Yet the precise interests protected by that test
remained unclear. It plainly did not protect integrated secondary em-
ployers by limiting the effect upon them to that which would be caused
by a strike shutting down the primary." 0 Although the Lumber Com-
pany depended upon the Boom Company to transport its logs, the Boom
Company-the only licensed carrier for the whole river-could have
continued other aspects of its business if the primary were shut down."'
But the Board allowed picketing which closed down all the secondary's
activities. Nor did the "straight line" test appear aimed at classic
106 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949).
107 Id. at 83.
108 Id. at 56.
109 95 CoNG. REc. 8709 (1949).
110 Cf. Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1411-15.
111 Although the Trial Examiner noted that all the logs stopped by the picketing
of the Boom Company were destined for the Lumber Company, and although the
three loggers Boom served did most of their business with the Lumber Company,
they did not do all of their business with the Lumber Company, and the findings are
silent with respect to other customers Boom may also have served. The Board did
not specifically adopt either alternative.
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strikebreaking situations. If the Boom Company's workers performed
unloading operations at the mill usually done by the strikers, the strikers
would have had an adequate chance to picket them at the primary's
premises. But neither the Trial Examiner nor the Board mentioned
these facts. Nor could the new test be directed at strikebreaking in the
storage sense, for concluding that Boom's uninterrupted operations en-
abled the primary to continue its business assumed Boom to be part of
the primary and was therefore circular. Moreover, if the essential
requirement for finding a single enterprise was that two companies
together produced a single end product, the test seemed arbitrary: two
companies could produce different products or provide different
services, yet still be so interrelated that the interests of their employees
were identical.
The Board eventually responded to these considerations by elimi-
nating the straight line prerequisite. In Brotherhood of Carpenters
(J.G. Roy & Sons Co.),"2 five brothers owned equal shares of a lumber
and a construction company and divided the joint income equally. All
five brothers were directors of the construction company, and four were
directors of the lumber company. The construction company bought
all its millwork requirements from the lumber company, but these pur-
chases were at competitive prices and constituted only five percent of the
lumber company's sales, six percent of the construction company's total
purchases, and twenty-five percent of its lumber purchases."' When
the union called the construction company's employees off the jobsite in
an attempt to organize the lumber company's employees, the district
court noted that the two companies were actually controlled by different
brothers and held that the relatedness required by the single enterprise
doctrine was one of business activities rather than ownership or man-
agement," 4 distinguished Irwin-Lyons on the ground that these firms
were "regularly engaged in entirely separate enterprises," 1'5 and
granted an injunction. Approaching the case with a broader philosophy,
the Trial Examiner found the apparently autonomous companies to be
merely different phases of a family joint venture in the building industry
and held that the construction company could be picketed because its
officers had the power, as members of the lumber company's board of
directors, to resolve the primary's labor disputes.'16
Because this holding overextended the single enterprise doctrine
by permitting primary employees to picket any business controlled by
112 118 N.L.R.B. 286 (1957), rev'd and remanded, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958).
113 Id. at 290.
114 Alpert v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, 143 F. Supp. 371, 375 (D. Mass. 1956).
115 Id. at 376.
116 118 N.L.R.B. at 299.
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persons sitting on the primary's board of directors, the Board found
different reasons for sustaining the result. Ignoring the finding that
different persons effectively controlled the two corporations and that
the secondary bought its millwork from the primary because the primary
was the only local source, the Board held, over Member Rodgers' dis-
sent,117 that the secondary's purchases from the primary constituted a
straight line relationship under Irwin-Lyons. The opinion continued,
however, explaining that:
[T]he Board did not decide in Irwin-Lyons that the absence
of a "single line operation" precludes a finding of an ally rela-
tionship. [Such a] determination . . . must be based on all
the circumstances presented. Even if there were no "single
line operation" here, we conclude that the element is not a
prerequisite to the establishment of an ally relationship and
that such a relationship is established . . . where the busi-
nesses of the primary and the secondary employers are com-
monly owned and controlled . *...11
The First Circuit reversed on the ground that two employers did not
become allies merely by conducting sales transactions with one another.
And whether or not a straight line operation was needed to find an
employer nonneutral, the Board in this case could not even establish the
degree of common control found in Irwin-Lyons. "[A]ctual common
control over labor policies or any other phase of the operations," not
just the potential control implicit in common ownership, was required
before two employers could be found to be a single enterprise." 9
Even when common ownership and actual control were indisput-
ably present, the straight line concept caused difficulties. In Warehouse
Workers Local 688 (Bachman Machine Co.), 20 the same individual
was president and majority stockholder of the primary and secondary
employers, owned the separate buildings in which the primary and
secondary operated, and exercised active control over both companies'
collective bargaining, although he ran only the secondary's day-to-day
117 Id. at 288. Member Rodgers argued that: "There is neither common man-
agement, nor common operation, nor common control over labor relations, nor unified
production effort. The only elements of integration . . . are common ownership,
interlocking directorates, and ordinary buying and selling." Id. at 290.
118 Id. at 287-88.
119 J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771, 773 (Ist Cir. 1958) (emphasis
added) ; accord, Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B.
No. 25, 75 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1970); American Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists
(Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 75 L.R.R.M. 1018 (1970) ; Teamsters Local
639 (Poole's Warehousing, Inc.), 158 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1966); Newspaper Pressmen
Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962). enforced, 322 F.2d
405 (D.C. Cir. 1963). On remand the Board accepted the First Circuit's Roy
decision as the law for that case only, refusing to disclaim its earlier view. 120
N.L.R.B. 1016 & n.3 (1958).
120 121 N.L.R.B. 1229 (1958).
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operations. The primary, Plastics Molding Co., bought eighty percent
of its molds from the secondary, Bachman Machine Co., which pur-
chased "most" of the plastic parts required for the machines it made
from Plastics. When Plastics' employees struck for a new contract,
they also picketed the secondary's premises a block away, alleging an
alliance. The Board reaffirmed its departure from the straight line test,
but found the common control exercised in conjunction with the com-
mon ownership sufficient to deny Bachman the immunity of a neutral. 2 '
The Eighth Circuit reversed, 22 pointing out that the primary and
secondary employees were represented by different unions, that their
interests were completely separate because the two businesses were
"unrelated," and the president's common ownership and control over
both companies' labor policies was therefore irrelevant:
Bachman's participation, as President of Plastics, in the bar-
gaining sessions with the Union, which represented only the
employees of Plastics and had nothing to do with the em-
ployees of Bachman, [is] insufficient to justify the conclusion
of the Board that Plastics and Bachman were so intimately
and inextricably united as to constitute them one employer
123
Judge Woodrough entered a perceptive dissent in which he argued that
the president's concern with maintaining the high wages of the second-
ary's (skilled) workmen would directly influence his reaction to the
(unskilled) strikers' demands. He suggested that when the same per-
son owned both corporations and controlled their labor relations, the
boundary between them was sufficiently indistinct to prevent legal form
from controlling the result. 24
If the dominant impression left by this string of cases is one of
confusion, that impression is justified. It is apparent that the single
enterprise doctrine developed not so much from a need to prevent actual
strikebreaking as from the related public policy of preserving the
traditional scope of the primary employees' right to strike their em-
ployer.12  For example, when two centrally controlled companies are
121 Id. at 1229 n.1. Member Rodgers repeated his dissent in Roy, arguing that
common ownership and control, even if actual, were not enough to validate the
secondary boycott when the 2 employers were separate, nonintegrated enterprises.
Id. at 1229-30.
122 Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 266 F2d 599 (8th Cir. 1959).
123 Id. at 605.
124 Id. at 605-07. The Board on remand again accepted the reversal as the law
for that case alone. 124 N.L.R.B. 743, 744 (1959).
125 The importance of the right to strike is conceded: "Collective bargaining can
hardly exist without preserving the right to strike [because] one cannot negotiate
without the ability to reject the proferred terms." A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL
LABOR PoLIcY 48 (1960).
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engaged in the same line of business, the second will almost certainly
take up the slack caused by a strike against the first. Therefore, in
such cases, a union may picket the second company without showing
that any struck work has been transferred.' But the same result
should also obtain when the two are commonly controlled but engaged
in completely different businesses so that strikebreaking is impossible.
If strikers can appeal to fellow employees in unrelated bargaining units
of the same employer in the name of "mutual aid or protection," 127 they
should be allowed to do so when those unrelated bargaining units are
different companies within the same employer's enterprise: in either
case the right to strike includes the right to a meaningful if not to a
successful strike, and the persuasive power of many strikes upon the
employer would be greatly reduced if they were limited to the bargain-
ing unit immediately concerned. When two entities form a single
enterprise, concerted activity by the employees of the first against the
second is no more unlawful than activity aimed at other employees of
the first: the primary employer is not prevented from doing business
with an "other person," but only with himself. 2 8 Any other rule
would permit the employer to divide and conquer by doing business
through several corporations, each comprising one bargaining unit.
But a strong public policy militates against the unnecessary pro-
liferation of labor disputes, 29 and the standards for measuring when
sufficient "relatedness" exists to justify holding two entities to be one
are tenuous in the absence of a definite action such as farming out
work. In addition to common ownership, common control, and integra-
tion of operations, the Board and the courts have looked to whether the
two companies do substantial business with each other, occupy the
same premises, share or exchange employees or interchange functions,
advance each other credit or do business on less than competitive terms,
or maintain separate records, payrolls, tax returns, and public images.
30
126 See, e.g., Milwaukee Plywood Co. v. NLRB, 285 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), aff'g
126 N.L.R.B. 650 (1960) ; Teamsters Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse & Sales Co.),
128 N.L.R.B. 916 (1960).
12729 U.S.C. § 157 (1964); see, e.g., Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v.
NLRB, 386 U.S. 664, 668 (1967). The Supreme Court noted that: "A boycott
cannot become secondary because engaged in by primary employees not directly
affected by the dispute . . . ." Id. at 669.
128 "To give such broad scope to the term [other person] would, for instance,
reach out to and include the business relation between an employee of the primary
employer (Ebasco, in this case) and the primary employer . . . . " Douds v. Metro-
politan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
129LMRA § 1(b), 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964). "There must be . . . an actual,
as distinct from merely a potential, integration of operations and management
policies" for two commonly owned business enterprises to be treated as one, because
"it [is] not in the public interest for one business enterprise to be halted because
of the unrelated problems of another." Newspaper Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB,
322 F2d 405, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
130 .g., Teamsters Local 639 (Poole's Warehousing, Inc.), 158 N.L.R.B. 1281,
1286-87 (1966); Newspaper Pressmen Local 46 (Knight Newspapers, Inc.), 138
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The result is a naked exercise of judicial discretion-an unspoken
balancing of the right to strike against the strike's projected social
advisability. The test for singleness requires a sufficient accumulation
of the considerations enumerated above.' 3' Because any number of
these considerations may arise in a particular case with each con-
sideration given a different weight, the constraining pressure of
stare decisis to articulate a decision's rationale in accord with precedent
is largely absent. The decisionmaker's personal concept of what is
best for society often determines which sum of the relationships is suffi-
cient to justify holding two companies one, under cover of a general
rule.
This concern with the societal effect of findings of singleness
underlies the rule that sales transactions between two entities do not
make them one," 2 even when the secondary is the primary's exclusive
distributor and thus has a substantial interest in the outcome of the
latter's labor disputes. 33  Exclusive or substantial dealing, even when
combined with common ownership, is too common to permit the
geometrical increase in the effect of strikes that holding the dealers to
be a single enterprise would entail. This concern also explains why
the "potential control inherent in common ownership" is insufficient to
warrant application of the doctrine." 4  Although primary employers
owned by secondaries are likely to follow the latters' desires even absent
active control, common ownership is too prevalent to allow all mergers
and acquisitions to result in "single enterprises" in which all parts will
be vulnerable to a component's labor dispute. Above all, this concern
offers the principal, and perhaps the only, rationale for the straight
N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962), enforced, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Teamsters Local
282 (Acme Concrete & Supply Corp.), 137 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962); General Drivers
Local 806 (Ada Transit Mix), 130 N.L.R.B. 788, 799 (1961).
131 See L. JAFFE & N. NATHANSON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 370-82 (2d ed. 1961).
132See, e.g., Schauffler v. Retail Store Union Dist. 65, 41 L.R.R.M. 2404 (E.D.
Pa. 1957) ; General Drivers Local 745 (Associated Wholesale Grocery), 118 N.L.R.B.
1251, 1255 (1957), enforced in part, 264 F.2d 642 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814
(1959); Carpenters Dist. Council (Wadsworth Bldg. Co.), 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 806
(1949).
"3 E.g., NLRB v. Wine Workers Local 1 (Schenley Distillers Co.), 178 F2d
584 (2d Cir. 1949); Grain Elevator Workers Local 418 (Continental Grain Co.),
155 N.L.R.B. 402 (1965) (exclusive handling of 2.8 million bushels of primary's
grain insufficient); Milk Drivers Local 584 (Old Du.ch Farms, Inc.), 146 N.L.R.B.
509, 516 (1964), enforced, 341 F2d 29 (2d Cir. 1965) (processing primary's product
insufficient without exercising control) ; Teamsters Local 996 (Waialua Dairy), 111
N.L.R.B. 1220 (1955) (exclusive production for secondary under long-term contract
insufficient). But cf. McLeod v. Milk Drivers Local 584, 54 L.R.R.M. 2287 (E.D.
N.Y. 1963) (processor performs integral function in primary's business).
"34See J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F2d 771, 773 (1st Cir. 1958);
cases cited note 119 supra. See also Retail Clerks Local 1017 v. NLRB. 249 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1957) (lessor-lessee relationship plus common site insufficient) ; General
Drivers Local 806 (Ada Transit Mix), 130 N.L.R.B. 788 (1961) (father-son relation-
ship between owners of primary and owners of secondary plus guarantee of bank
loans to secondary insufficient) ; General Drivers Local 745 (Associated Wholesale
Grocery), 118 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1957) (purchase of 30% of requirements from primary
plus power to help elect primary's directors insufficient without active control).
1970]
322 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
line requirement. Even within the scope of the cases discussed above,
the straight line idea has undergone a noteworthy metamorphosis. The
Trial Examiner in Irwin-Lyons thought the primary need only be de-
pendent upon the secondary for some aspect of its production function
for the two to constitute a "single integrated operation." ' The Roy
court seems to have believed that if the primary furnished most of a
product necessary to the secondary's operation, then they were a
single enterprise if commonly controlled.13 Under this standard the
relationship in Bachman Machine would certainly be straight line, but
the Bachman court evidently disagreed. 37  These apparent incon-
sistencies disappear when the straight line concept is recognized as
merely another aspect of the quest for a viable limiting principle under-
lying the single enterprise concept; it represents a judgment that
common ownership and control are too prevalent to permit the economic
dislocation which making them the exclusive test for singleness would
entail.1
38
Although a societal need to limit the single enterprise doctrine
is doubtless present, limiting it by the straight line concept undermines
the very right to strike the doctrine supposedly protects. If the general
test for the doctrine's application is to be how many breakdowns in the
normal distance between two employers dealing at arm's length must
occur, the one element which seems both necessary and sufficient for
holding two firms to be one is active common control over labor re-
lations. 3 Such control will seldom be exercised without common
13589 N.L.R.B. at 83.
136 "In contrast to [Irwin-Lyons], Roy Construction's purchases of millwork
from Roy Lumber constitute a very small part of the total sales and purchases of
both companies and were [therefore] not part of a 'unified production effort.'" J. G.
Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771, 773 (1st Cir. 1958).
137 The Bachman court apparently emphasized its finding that the companies were
"engaged in a different, separate and nonintegrated business" and downgraded its
finding that "each is a substantial customer of the other" in refusing to hold Irwin-
Lyons applicable. Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 266 F2d 599, 602, 605 (8th Cir.
1959).
138 See, e.g., Employing Lithographers v. NLRB (Lithographers Local 78), 301
F2d 20, 29 (5th Cir. 1962), miodifying and enforcing 130 N.L.R.B. 968 (1961)
(common ownership and control do not conclusively establish a "single enterprise").
139 Certainly [the secondary] was the agent of [the primary] for some pur-
poses. It was [the primary's] agent for receiving freight consigned to
[the primary], for soliciting freight for [the primary], for receiving telephone
calls for [the primary]. The pertinent question here is whether [the sec-
ondary] was lthe primary's] agent with regard to [the primary's] labor
relations with the [disputing employees].
Truck Drivers Local 728 v. Empire State Express, Inc., 293 F.2d 414, 420 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961) (emphasis added) ; see Building Service Employees
Local 32-J v. NLRB, 313 F.2d 880, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1963), denying enforcement to
135 N.L.R.B. 909 (1962); J.G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F2d 771, 773-74
(1st Cir. 1958) (dictum) (common ownership plus actual control qualifies as a
"single enterprise") ; Squillacote v. Teamsters Local 695 (Chase, Inc.), 60 L.R.R.M.
2057, 2059 (W.D. Wis. 1965) ; Administrative Ruling of the General Counsel, Case
No. SR-1948, 50 L.R.R.M. 1102 (1962) (common ownership plus overall supervision
of three separate plants' labor regulations sufficient).
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ownership.1 40 But even absent common ownership, to deny primary
employees the right to bring pressure against a secondary determining
the employment conditions against which they are protesting unreason-
ably curtails their right to strike and tends to undermine industrial
peace. Regardless of the extent to which the two companies' businesses
are "unrelated" or their employees represented by different unions, for
all practical purposes the secondary is the primary workers' employer.
The situation is indistinguishable from that of separate bargaining
units within the same company but on different premises, in which case
picketing of the "secondary" is plainly permissible."4 Even if he
merely negotiates contracts without supervising day-to-day grievances,
the manager exercising common control effectively hires, fires, and
disciplines the primary workers by contracting for the grievance pro-
cedures, and his decisions with respect to each set of employees will
inevitably take into account their possible effect on the other sets and
on the whole single enterprise.
Moreover, by not limiting primary pressure, Congress has de-
clared that however dislocating the impact of a strike by workers
against their own employer, the social interest in allowing the strike to
go forward outweighs the interest in avoiding the possible harm.
Given this congressional policy, it seems unreasonable, having found
the active control of labor relations that normally makes the secondary
the primary workers' de facto employer, to require a closer relation-
ship on unstated social interest grounds unsupported by the con-
gressional mandate. In this light the Bachman decision seems to over-
reach the single enterprise analysis. Although the satisfaction of
Bachman's straight line standard does indicate an additional degree
of "concern" on the part of the secondary in the outcome of the pri-
mary's dispute, 142 requiring this extra relatedness is unnecessary either
to limit the single enterprise doctrine or to protect the underlying right
to strike. As a limiting principle, "integration of operations" reveals
no more secondary power over the primary employees' working con-
ditions than active common control itself, and the test protects values
Congress intentionally left unguarded.
Although the straight line concept has little significance in limiting
the single enterprise doctrine, it may have a substantial impact on that
140 Indeed, the general managerial control of daily operations often mentioned is
frequently read as a synonym for control of labor relations. Compare, e.g., Teamsters
Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse & Sales Co.), 128 N.L.R.B. 916, 919 (1960), with
Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 75
L.R.R.M. 1014, 1016 (1970) (control of labor relations flows from general managerial
control).
141 E.g., Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 664 (1967);
NLRB v. General Drivers Local 968 (Otis Massey Co.), 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
14 2 See Borus & Warshal, supra note 105.
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doctrine's expansion. When two companies are not commonly owned
and controlled, they may nonetheless be sufficiently related to justify
extending the dispute. If their integration is substantial, the labor de-
cisions of each will be largely calculated in light of their effect upon the
other, and the interests of both sets of employees in the conditions under
which each works will be correspondingly increased.
The paradigm case is Teamsters Local 282 (Acme Concrete &
Supply Corp.),143 in which the primary, Twin County, distributed con-
crete manufactured from raw materials provided by the secondary,
Acme Concrete. The two firms occupied the same premises, and Twin
County bought almost all its raw materials, constituting eighty-five
percent of Acme's sales, from Acme Concrete. An outsider owned
Twin County, but Acme was owned by Twin County's manager's wife
and operated by the manager's two brothers. Acme Concrete owned
the joint premises and made unsecured loans to Twin County, while
Twin County paid no rent, housed its manager immediately above
Acme's office, and "conspicuously displayed" its name on Acme's build-
ing. When Twin County's employees picketed the gate reserved for
Acme's employees as well as the general entrance, the Trial Examiner
concluded that the evidence did not support a single enterprise find-
ing."' The Board, however, announced that:
We need not here determine whether the relationship be-
tween Acme and Twin County is one of "single employer" or
"ally." It is sufficient that Acme and Twin County have such
identity and community of interests as negative the claim that
Acme is a neutral employer.1
45
The crucial circumstances are, of course, the integration of the com-
panies' operations and the close proximity of the working conditions of
the two companies' employees, because these circumstances directly de-
termine the terms of the workers' employment. The other considera-
tions suggested by the Board ease the decisionmaker's conscience by
143 137 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962).
144 Id. at 1329.
145 Id. at 1324 (citations omitted). The court had earlier denied a § 10(l) petition
for an injunction in this case:
While those facts . . . do not establish co'nmon ownership or control of
Acme and Twin County. . . . there was ample evidence of such identity
and community of interests as would negative the claim that Acme is a
neutral employer.
Kaynard v. Teamsters Local 282, 200 F. Supp. 505, 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), accord,
Ad'-inistrative Ruling of the General Counsel, Case No. SR-1164, 47 L.R.R.M. 1573
(1961); see Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB (Sears, Roebuck & Co.), 429 F2d
747 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (primary's status as an independent contractor plus absence of
direct secondary control of primary employees' working conditions irrelevant- if
sufficient economic interest and dependence are present).
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assuring him that as long as they must be present, other decisionmakers
will be restrained from overextending his decision.
B. Extensions: Actual Common Control
Because the purpose of the single enterprise doctrine is to permit
the disputing employees to reach those who-like the primary employer
-determine their working conditions, when one company actually con-
trols the other's labor relations, the two should clearly be held to be a
single enterprise. Lacking actual common control, a finding of single-
ness may still be possible, although an enormous increase in the other
interrelationships between the two companies seems necessary to gen-
erate the primary-type community of interests between the two sets of
employees. This nearly conclusive importance of actual common con-
trol is illustrated by the "two hats" cases in which work connected with
the secondary employer's operations is performed by an independent
contractor, the primary, who is also the secondary's employee. The
contractor's dual roles provide a strong inference that the secondary
actually controls his operations as an independent contractor.
In Teamsters Local 20 (National Cement Products Co.),' one
Edwards took over the independent trucking business which trans-
ported some of the secondary's products. Edwards was either the
son- or brother-in-law of four of the secondary's five partners and was
also the secondary's salaried salesman-buyer. He maintained separate
social security and workmen's compensation records for his trucking
employees and set their wages, hours, and terms of employment, but
his sales office at the secondary's plant also served as his trucking firm's
office. In addition, the trucks were garaged on the secondary's prem-
ises and were used to haul only for the secondary according to its needs.
When the union induced the secondary's employees to refuse to load
Edwards' trucks, the Trial Examiner found no violation on the grounds
that the secondary's ties to Edwards gave it the power to resolve the
dispute, and that the inference of actual control arising from those ties
was too strong to be rebutted.'47 The Board, however, held that de-
spite the two firm's physical and economic integration, neither the em-
ployment nor the family relationship nor a combination of them sufficed,
absent a showing of actual common control, to make Edwards in his
independent trucker capacity part of the secondary's enterprise.1
48
146115 N.L.R.B. 1290 (1956).
147Id. at 1299-1300 (second ground by implication).
14S Id. at 1292-93. Member Murdock's dissent prophetically noted that:
[Iun the 1 Board and 1 court case in which it has thus far been found that
a secondary employer was unneutral or an ally of the primary employer
[Irwin-Lyons and Ebasco], there was either evidence of common ownership
and managerial control, or transfer of struck work, neither of which are [sic]
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In Building Services Employees Local 32-f (Terminal Barber
Shops) 149 the secondary employer, Terminal, fired its independent
unionized cleaner. After personally negotiating unsatisfactory contracts
with two other cleaners, the supervisor of one of Terminal's shops ob-
tained the cleaning contract. The supervisor provided cleaning services
only for Terminal, operated his cleaning business out of the shop he
supervised, reported to himself in his supervisory capacity with respect
to cleaning his own shop, and decided not to sign a union contract after
consulting Terminal. When the union picketed Terminal's shops in an
attempt to force it to stop doing business with the supervisor-cleaner,
the Board adopted the Trial Examiner's conclusion. Because the super-
visor maintained separate records and insurance for his cleaning em-
ployees, and had already lost his cleaning contract at two shops for
failure to provide satisfactory services, 5 ' he dealt at arm's length with
the secondary and was not part of the latter's enterprise.
But the considerations on which the Trial Examiner relied made a
finding of singleness dependent on easily manipulated conduct. On
appeal the court noted the supervisor's overlapping management func-
tions, the lack of an independent labor policy, and the danger that such
arrangements could easily be used by employers "as a device to achieve
insulation from union activity," and denied enforcement.
The inquiry in the present case was limited to whether [the
supervisor] was an "independent contractor." We think it
clear, however, that [his] relationship to Terminal was in the
"zone of dispute in which such formulae are useless" and
• . . required consideration of such facts as, for example, the
history of [his] relationship to Terminal; the conduct of his
cleaning business and its relation to Terminal's business; and
Terminal's influence on, if not control over, [his] labor policy.
In our view, these facts make inescapable the conclusion that
Terminal was not a neutral within the meaning of the
statute. 5'
Relying on a similar analysis, however, another court found-without
looking at any other facts-that when an employee had an established
independent business and maintained that business after acquiring a
present here. There is nothing in those cases, however, which even suggests
that in no other situation can a finding be made that the secondary employer
is not a neutral or "wholly unconcerned" employer.
Id. at 1295.
149135 N.L.R.B. 909 (1962).
150 Id. at 915-17.
151 Building Service Employees Local 32-j v. NLRB, 313 F.2d 880, 883 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (emphasis added).
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contract from his employer, sufficient common control could not exist
despite the straight line nature of the contracted work.' 52
The Terminal court found mere influence on labor relations sig-
nificant, even in the absence of common ownership. A similar pro-
gression toward recognizing the unique importance of actual common
control appears when common ownership is present. In Newspaper
Pressmen Local 46 (Knzight Newspapers, Inc.), 1a3 for instance, the
secondary Detroit corporation owned all the stock in its Miami sub-
sidiary and the same individuals were president and vice-president of
both. Despite the identity of owners and officers, the Board found that
different persons controlled the general operations and labor policies of
the two companies, and held that the Miami employees could not law-
fully picket the parent corporation in Detroit. In a more extreme
example, Teamsters Local 639 (Poole's Warehousing, Inc.),"5 the two
commonly owned and officered entities were located in the same city
and did significant business with each other in addition to sharing a
bookkeeper, cars, an office, and a telephone. Nevertheless, the Board
held that separate managers making independent labor decisions kept
the two distinct. Finally, in twin cases decided the same day,' 55 the
Board held that subsidiary divisions of the same corporation were not
parts of a single enterprise absent active control by the parent over the
daily labor decisions of each division-a result previously reached by
the courts granting 10(l) injunctions in these cases.156
152 Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871, 878 (E.D. Tenn. 1963),
aff'd on other grounds, 343 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
The decision's rationale was apparently that since the "employee" was not dependent
upon his employer for all his business as an independent contractor, the inference of
independence was sufficiently powerful not to be rebutted by anything in the case.
153 138 N.L.R.B. 1346 (1962), enforced, 322 F2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The
Trial Examiner explained that:
The Board . . . will not consider two corporate entities as one, unless
the operations of the two companies have been conducted in such a maner [sic]
as to indicate that to an appreciable degree the separateness of the two
entities has not been maintained. Thus, even though two corporations may
have substantially identical officers and directors and one may be wholly
owned by the other, if there is no showing that there was an appreciable
amount of common active control, I assume the Board would not consider the
two as a single employer.
Id. at 1353 (emphasis in original).
154158 N.L.R.B. 1281 (1966).
155 Los Angeles Newspaper Guild Local 69 (Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. No.
25, 75 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1970) (divisions engaged in the same type of work) ; American
Fed'n of Television and Radio Artists (Hearst Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. No. 26, 75
L.R.R.M. 1018 (1970) (divisions engaged in different work).
156 See Kennedy v. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild, 69 L.R.R.M. 2301
(N.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 412 F2d 541 (9th Cir. 1969); Penello v. American Fed'n
of Television and Radio Artists, 291 F. Supp. 409 (D. Md. 1968); cf. NLRB v.
Amalgamated Lithographers Local 17, 309 F.2d 31, 38-41 (9th Cir. 1962) (chain
shop clause extended only to actively controlled subsidiaries and therefore did not
encompass "other persons" within the meaning of § 8(e)).
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C. Coemployers
Even when a secondary employer has no close relations with a
primary employer, he may still be "concerned" in the latter's dispute
if he possesses enough control over the manner in which the primary
employees perform their tasks to be termed their "coemployer." The
distinction between this concept and the single enterprise doctrine is
philosophically insignificant, for both rest on the need to preserve the
primary workers' right to strike those determining their working con-
ditions. The distinction is, however, tactically crucial, because circum-
stances suggesting coemployer status are even more prevalent than
those required for singleness. If it is easier for a union to argue that
the secondary it has picketed is part of the primary's single enterprise
than that the secondary is performing the primary's struck work, it is
even easier for the picketers to argue that the secondary employer,
because he supervises their activities, should be treated as their own.
This implication of Ebasco's second ground was first made explicit
in Truck Drivers Local 728 (Empire State Express, Inc.).1 Empire
State, a company with headquarters in Columbus, Georgia, purchased
ACA's local and long-distance Atlanta trucking franchise, hired ACA's
long-distance drivers, and decided to subcontract the local cartage to
Service, which immediately hired ACA's local cartage employees.
While waiting for the Atlanta long-distance drivers to move to
Columbus, Empire "temporarily" authorized Service to dispatch and
pay them and handle their grievances. The Atlanta drivers regarded
Service as their actual employer, and under the contract Service
solicited and handled all of Empire's Atlanta freight and represented
itself to be part of Empire's service network.' When the Atlanta
drivers walked out over an unrelated dispute, Empire took up the
slack by dispatching all its Atlanta trucks from Columbus. Three
weeks later, when Service was no longer dispatching or handling the
grievances of any Empire drivers, the union picketed its terminal in an
attempt to organize Empire, inducing a general strike.
The Trial Examiner found that Service was Empire's "alter ego"
by virtue of its power over the Empire drivers and recommended dis-
missing the complaint.15 9 The Board bypassed this coemployer analysis
and found a violation on the ground that the relevant time for deter-
mining the legality of the picketing was that of the organizational
drive, not the walkout. Because Empire had never had control over
157 116 N.L.R.B. 615 (1956).
158 Id. at 617. The arrangement was probably more than temporary, for Empire
was negotiating, through Service, a plan to let the drivers remain in Atlanta per-
manently. Id. at 631.
159 Id. at 632-34.
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Service and Service controlled no Empire drivers when the picketing
began, no argument that the picketing was lawful could be sustained."'0
Yet on the same facts the Fifth Circuit, noting that if ACA had con-
tinued in business the union could certainly have picketed its local-
cartage unit, dismissed Empire's action for damages under section 303.
The court explained that Service ceased to exercise general supervision
over Empire's long-distance drivers
only when there were no longer any drivers to supervise
S. .. [O]nce the strike began . . . the employer could
not make a change in form which would deprive the strikers
of the right to call on their fellow drivers to support their
action.
The immediately preceding economic history of the two
companies, plus the fact that nearly all of Service's business
was with Empire, plus the fact that the over-the-road drivers
were generally supervised and dispatched by [Service] . . .
convinces us that Service was not the unconcerned, neutral
employer whom Sections 8(b) (4) and 303 . . . were de-
signed to protect . ... 161
The coemployer analysis suggested in Empire State was further
clarified by the several opinions in Teamsters Local 24 (A.C.E. Trans-
portation Co.).12 ACE partly operated its own long-haul trucking
but also leased tractors with drivers from independents. The inde-
pendent lessors repaired and insured their own tractors, set their
drivers' wages, paid them, and maintained workmen's compensation,
tax returns, and social security records for them. The leases provided,
however, that only drivers meeting ACE's employment standards
could be hired by the lessors to drive the leased vehicles. In addition,
ACE exercised detailed supervisory control over the drivers' operations
through a strictly enforced training manual and the power to cancel
leases if the lessors did not follow its instructions on discharging and
disciplining drivers.
When the union picketed ACE in a drive to organize the lessors'
drivers, the Trial Examiner found no violation of the secondary boy-
cott section. Because ACE possessed sufficient control over the drivers
to be held their employer for the purposes of sections 8(a) (3) and
9(c), and could be required under the statute to bargain collectively
with them, it could not be "unconcerned":
160 Id. at 622. Member Murdock dissented, arguing that despite its independent
contractor status, Service was Empire's agent for handling labor problems wikh the
truck drivers within the meaning of § 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1964),
and there was no showing that this authority had been revoked. 116 N.L.R.B. at
625-26.
161 Truck Drivers Local 728 v. Empire State Express, Inc., 293 F.2d 414, 423 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).
162 120 N.L.R.B. 1103 (1958), enforcement denied, 266 F2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
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[A]n employer-employee relationship . . . exist[s] where
the party for whom the services in question are performed re-
serves the right . . . to determine not merely the result [for
which the ostensibly independent contractor was hired] but
the methods and means by which such result is to be accom-
plished. . . . [S]uch veto power by a contractor over the
hire and discharge of employees by its subcontractor [is] of
itself sufficient to constitute the contractor and [sic] employer
jointly with the subcontractor over these employees .... 163
The Trial Examiner recognized that neither common ownership nor
control were in evidence and held that a common law right of control
by the secondary over the primary's employees sufficed to make the two
"coemployers." 14
In its haste to overturn this result, the Eisenhower Board invoked
every available questionable principle. First, it suggested that the
only relevant control for ally purposes was the secondary employer's
control over the primary employer, while here the primary was an inde-
pendent contractor. The section 8(a) cases cited by the Trial Exam-
iner were therefore distinguishable because they involved control over
employees rather than single enterprise situations. The Examiner's
section 9(c) case was similarly distinguishable, since it concerned a
self-employed one-man independent contractor who was not part of
another bargaining unit whereas the lessors' drivers were not self-
employed." Moreover, said the Board's majority, ACE's mere control
over the manner in which the drivers operated could not make it an
ally because such control over the independent contractors' employees
is always necessary to insure proper accomplishment of the purpose for
which the subcontract was made. In addition, ACE's lack of legal
power to grant the pickets' organizational demand made their action
illegal per se. Finally, the majority concluded with the question-
begging statement that a "concerned" employer for 8(b) (4) purposes
was solely one involved in a dispute with his own employees.' 66
Member Fanning concurred on the ground that if in "certain cir-
cumstances" a secondary could be the coemployer of an independent
contractor's workers, this case did not contain those circumstances 167
a result ignoring the fact that if the pervasive control exercised by ACE
did not suffice, none would. Member Bean adopted the Trial Exam-
iner's coemployer analysis in his dissent, adding that because ACE
163 Id. at 1129.
1
64
1d. at 1131.
165 Id. at 1105. The Trial Examiner cited National Van Lines (Teamsters Local
389), 117 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1957).
166 120 N.L.R.B. at 1108-09.
167Id. at 1112.
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exercised sufficient control over the lessors' drivers to be their employer
under the common law representation test, the drivers were part of its
bargaining unit, and that it did possess power to grant the union's
demand.' The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia re-
jected the Board's narrow reasoning and adopted the dissent:
The answer to the problem before us cannot be reached
by the use of any legalistic word or phrase, such as "co-
employer", or "independent contractor", or even "ally" ....
. . . [T]he relationships of ACE, these drivers, and the
lessor-owners are so intertwined with respect to employment
that ACE was not protected by the statute against the impact
of a strike . . . .The many tiny strands of ACE control
over these drivers cannot be extricated from the total fabric
of mutual obligation. Those strands are clearly part of the
patterns of the employer-employee relationship. 9
Thus, the Board, although apparently accepting the coemployer
concept in an early case, 7 ' and freely finding one-man independent con-
tractors coemployed for section 8(b) (4) (B) purposes-and- even
applying a more liberal standard of control to them "''-firmly resisted
extending the concept to independent contractors' employees, and for
fourteen years after Ebasco let no attempted extension standY.2  The
Board's reasons for this resistance were twofold: a conscientious desire
to confine strikes within their narrowest possible bounds, and the
Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Denver Building Trades Coun-
cil,1 3 in which the Court had held that the supervision exercised by a
108 Id. at 1113-17. He averred that "a coemployer relationship may be found to
exist between parties who are otherwise bound to each other by no closer ties than
merely their contractual commitments." Id. at 1115.
109 Teamsters Local 24 v. NLRB, 266 F2d 675, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1959); see
Drivers Local 816 v. NLRB (Montgomery Ward & Co.), 292 F.2d 329, 331 (2d
Cir. 1961) (dictum), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), enforcing 127 N.L.R.B. 1059
(1961); Longshoremen's Local 1291 (National Sugar Refining Co.), 142 N.L.R.B.
257 (1963), enforced, 332 F2d 559 (3d Cir. 1964).
17O See Teamsters Local 294 (Conway's Express Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949)
(by implication), aff'd on other grounds, 195 F2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952).
171 In these cases, doing work similar to employees' work and being treated as
employees has been held sufficient, although the primary exercised no detailed control
over the manner of performance, but only over the result. E.g., Milk Drivers Local
546 (Minnesota Milk Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1314, 1316 (1961), enforced, 314 F.2d 761
(8th Cir. 1963) ; Construction Drivers Local 83 (Marshall & Haas), 133 N.L.R.B.
1144, 1145 (1961); Teamsters Local 249 (Polar Water Co.), 120 N.L.R.B. 155,
162 (1958).
172 E.g., Chauffeurs Local 135 (Hoosier Petroleum Co.), 106 N.L.R.B. 629
(1953). enforced, 212 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1954), in which the Trial Examiner found
extensive control exercised by the secondary over the primary's drivers, including
disciplinary power. Id. at 640. Nevertheless, the Board held that such power was
merely necessary to ensure the result desired by the secondary and did "not reflect
such a right of control . . . over the manner or means of [the primary's] per-
formance of his contract as is required by the applicable common law right-of-control
test. . . ." Id. at 631.
'73 341 U.S. 675 (1951) ; see text accompanying notes 194-210 infra.
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general construction contractor over the employees of his independent
subcontractors was insufficient to make him the subcontractors' ally in
a dispute. But the one-man independent contractor rule, the core of
the Board's approach, was logically untenable since it was absurd to
hold that an individual operating as a subcontractor was coemployed
by the primary employer, but became independent if he hired a helper,
when the primary's control over his working conditions remained the
same.
1 74
The first breach in the Board's resistance came in Truck Drivers
Local 107 (Sterling Wire Products Co.),'7 5 in which a bare majority
relied upon unique history and the secondary's control over the seniority
and normal duties of the independent's employees in holding that the
secondary operated as a coemployer. But the Board apparently delivered
the coup de grace to the one-man rule in Teamsters Local 559 (Atlantic
Pipe Corp.) .176 In Atlantic Pipe, the primary employer hauled exclu-
sively for the secondary as its contract carrier. Although commonly
owned and officered, the two firms operated from separate premises.
The Trial Examiner held that the two firms' alternating supervision of
the hourly activities of the primary drivers made the secondary their
coemployer. Although the opinion purported to rest on the two firms'
integrated operations as well as the coemployer theory, the only prece-
dent cited for the result was a section 8(a) (5) case in which evidence
of integration did not significantly figure. 7 The Board adopted the
decision without comment.
The remaining major question is whether the control needed to
make the secondary a coemployer must be actively exercised or merely
retained. The frequently stated rule 178 that retention suffices finds little
support among the cases. In Empire State, the secondary stopped
exercising active control over the primary drivers' daily operations only
because the drivers were no longer working. In ACE Transportation,
ACE enforced the provisions of its training manual by following the
lessors' drivers with patrol cars .1 9  The secondary employers in Ster-
174 See Electrical Workers Local 501 v. NLRB (Langer), 181 F2d 34, 41 (2d
Cir. 1950) (Clark. J., dissenting), aff'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
175137 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1962).
176 172 N.L.R.B. No. 35, 1 CCH 1968 NLRB DEC. 122,633.
177 Greyhound Corp. (Transit Union), 153 N.L.R.B. 1488 (1965), enforced, 368
F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1966). The Trial Examiner in Atlantic Pipe noted with regard
to the coemployer concept that "[a]lthough research has revealed no case in which
this concept has been applied to a secondary boycott situation, [he could not] find
any precedent holding that the concept would not be so applicable." 172 N.L.R.B.
No. 35, 1 CCH 1968 NLRB DEC. ff 22,633.
178See, e.g., Teamsters Local 249 (Polar Water Co.), 120 N.L.R.B. 155, 162
(1958).
179 120 N.L.R.B. at 1129.
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ling Wire and Atlantic Pipe also exercised active control over the
working conditions of the striking employees. Even the one-man inde-
pendent contractor cases, in which the "mere retention" rule seems most
cited, exhibit actual control.
Moreover, if the rule were that the secondary becomes a co-
employer merely by retaining control over the manner in which the pri-
mary's employees accomplish their tasks, it would be demonstrably in-
correct. The retention principle is borrowed directly from section 8(a)
and 9(c) cases. I'8 Aside from the historical accident that Congress
enacted the statutory sections prohibiting employer unfair labor practices
before those banning unfair labor practices by unions so that the term
"employer" was judicially defined under the former, no substantial
reason exists for requiring different control for the coemployer test than
for the single enterprise doctrine. The two situations are equally preva-
lent and present equal potential for disrupting the economy, and in both
cases only active control by the secondary directly determines the work-
ing conditions of the common employees. The section 9(c) argument
-that the disputed workers would be part of the second employer's
bargaining unit for the purposes of representation proceedings before
the Board-is merely a useful analogy for preserving the workers' right
to reach those determining their working conditions. The language of
the section 9(c) cases should not be determinative when a more appro-
priate balancing test can be applied.' 8'
The other half of that balancing test must, of course, be the second-
ary's right to be free from unnecessary pressure. The cases discussed
above indicate that the limitation protecting that right is the require-
ment that the coemployer's control over the primary employees' work
be greater than that normally exercised by a secondary over an inde-
pendent contractor's employees. Minimizing the force of this limita-
tion may produce such tangled aberrations as the recent -decision in
Carpet Layers Local 419 v. NLRB (Sears, Roebuck & Co.),"' in
1SO E.g., NLRB v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 167 F2d 983 (7th Cir. 1948)
(§ 8(a)), enforcing 73 N.L.R.B. 1463 (1947) ; Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co.
(Insurance Agents' Union), 118 N.L.R.B. 412 (1957) (§9(c)).
181 There is comparatively little risk of serious economic dislocation in holding
an employer jointly bound to rectify another's intimidation of his employees, or to
recognize a union for bargaining purposes which may never result in a collective
bargaining contract. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (5), (d) (1964). The risk of disloca-
tion from holding that employer open to picketing by another's nominal workers is
considerably greater, however, and justifies a narrower construction of § 158(2) in
8(b) situations.
182 429 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1970), enforcing as modified 176 N.L.R.B. No. 120,
71 L.R.R.M. 1372 (1969). For another such aberration, see Steelworkers Local 6991
(Auburndale Freezer Corp.), 177 N.L.R.B. No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1969). rev'd
and remanded, 75 L.R.R.M. 2753 (5th Cir. 1970), in which a majority of the full
Board also minimized the independent secondary's right to be free from undeserved
union pressure.
19701
334 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.119:283
which the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia seized upon its
ACE Transportation language 1s3 to carry the coemployer and single
enterprise concepts to unacceptable lengths.
Sears sold carpeting at a retail price including installation, and had
arrangements with small businessmen to install the carpet at Sears'
expense. Sears prepared cost estimates and installation plans when the
carpeting was purchased, and placed these in the chosen installer's
pigeonhole on Sears' premises to be picked up with the uncut carpeting
for installation in the buyer's home. The installers, however, operated
out of individual locations under their own names, were wholly respon-
sible to the customers for defective work, and had complete power to
disregard the plans, increase the estimates to reflect the work's difficulty,
or reject any assignment they thought could not be satisfactorily per-
formed. In addition, the installers set their own employees' wage rates
and work schedules, genuinely negotiated their installation prices with
Sears, subcontracted some Sears work despite their contracts' terms,
and worked for customers other than Sears. Neither they nor their
workers were subject to Sears' work priorities, personnel regulations,
or benefit programs."'
When the union attempted to organize one of the installers by
picketing Sears, the Trial Examiner found the picketing secondary on
the dual grounds that since Sears controlled only the result of the in-
staller's work and not the manner of performance or labor decisions, it
was neither the installer's employer nor part of a single enterprise in-
cluding the installer. 18 5 The Board sustained the result, agreeing that
the installers were independent contractors and that Sears was not
"sufficiently related to [them] to destroy its neutrality."'8 6  The court
first noted that Sears' lack of legal power to resolve the dispute by
recognizing the union was not conclusive,"8 7 then remarked that Sears
had a direct economic interest in the installers' unionization because it
profited from the installations as well as its carpet sales,'8 8 and held that
the installers' status as independent contractors was not conclusive
either, if they could be analogized to Sears employees.
[T]he Board appears to have found the "ally" cases inappli-
cable because Sears was not legally capable of resolving the
dispute. To rephrase the Board's position as we understand
183 Text accompanying note 169 supra.
184 71 L.R.R.M. at 1374.
185 Carpet Layers Local 419, No. 27-CC-278 (N.L.R.B., Feb. 2, 1969) (Trial
Examiner) (by implication).
186 71 L.R.R.M. at 1374-75.
187 429 F.2d at 750.
18s Id. at 751.
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it, the Board would interpret the phrase "control over labor
policies," one of the criteria of a "single employer," to mean
control over whether a union is to be recognized, or direct
employer control over such fundamental employment factors
as wages and working conditions. To accept this view would
be to render the finding that the installers here were inde-
pendent contractors dispositive, a result this court heretofore
has not attributed to an independent contractor status.1so
The court then quoted from its opinion in ACE Transportation-in
which the picketed secondary in fact controlled the independent con-
tractors' working conditions-and remanded the case for further con-
sideration of whether
as in [ACE], the relationship between Sears and the in-
stallers might so resemble that of employer and employee that
a labor dispute with the installers could justifiably include
Sears ....
. . . While we support the findings of the Board that
the installers are not employees of Sears, they stand in such a
business relationship with Sears as to require further con-
sideration and explication by the Board of whether the
Union's effort to unionize the installers grows out of the same
kind of a relationship as would justify a union in picketing to
obtain unionization of employees of a primary employer. If
this is the case, Sears cannot be protected as a neutral. 9
The court's opinion seems to rest on two considerations: Sears'
economic interest in maintaining its competitive position in the carpet-
ing market by keeping the installers' costs low,' and its alleged
"influence over the relationship" with the installers through their func-
tional integration deriving from their contracts. 9 ' But these con-
siderations are present whenever an independent contractor regularly
works on some aspect of a retailer's finished product, and to hold them
determinative of the retailer's neutrality would irrationally multiply
the effect of strikes."' Without direct control by the secondary over
the contractor's labor policies or the details of its employees' perform-
ance, the contractor's workers can claim a right to appeal to neither
their fellow employees nor those determining their working conditions
189 Id. at 752.
190 Id. at 754. The court's cryptic interpretation of Ebasco---"that an employer
may not be insulated from union activities designed to affect a business relationship
which itself forms part of the dispute," id., seems greatly overstated. See text
accompanying notes 8-19 suPra.
191 429 F.2d at 751.
112 Id. at 752.
193 In addition to subjecting these prevalent subcontracting relationships to
blanket economic pressure, to hold that the outside union could picket Sears neces-
sarily implies that striking installers' employees could also do so.
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as justification for picketing the secondary. In this sense the Board's
finding that the installers were independent of Sears is dispositive-a
conclusion the court seems to have admitted by taking the extraordinary
step of enforcing the Board's order pending reconsideration by the
Board.
D. Conclusions: Single Enterprises
Absent his performance of struck work, a secondary employer may
be held picketable by another employer's employees or by an outside
union seeking to organize them in two major situations: when he
actively controls the primary employer's managerial and labor decisions,
or when he exercises supervisory power over the daily activities of the
primary employer's workers extending beyond control of the result to
control of the ways in which they perform their tasks. If neither type
of control is present, the secondary employer may still be found to be
"concerned" if his operations are sufficiently integrated both physically
and economically with those of the primary employer to create a com-
munity of interests between the two sets of workers analogous to that
between separate bargaining units working for the same employer. But
this third situation rarely occurs because, as Acme Concrete demon-
strates, the two employers' interrelationships in the absence of common
control or extensive supervision must be so great that when the sec-
ondary changes his employees' working conditions, a de facto change in
the working conditions of the primary employees results as well. Thus,
the presence of active common control or extensive supervision is con-
clusive in determining alliance in the absence of struck work; and al-
though the absence of these indices is not necessarily conclusive, it
should nearly always be decisive in fact.
Both the single enterprise and the coemployer concepts rest on the
need to preserve the disputing employees' right to appeal to all their
fellow workers to exert the primary strike's traditional complement of
economic pressure on those determining their working conditions: if
the secondary employer is the disputing employees' coemployer or part
of a single enterprise including their own "employer," the secondary
workers are their fellows and may justifiably be reached. Lacking clear
intermediate tests for the two concepts' applicability, such as the struck-
work doctrine's progressive determinations of what the primary em-
ployees' work is, whether it has been transferred, and whether it has
been transferred with the requisite motive, the Board and the courts
have introduced limitations such as the "straight line" requirement into
the administration of the two concepts to prevent their immunization
of ostensibly "secondary" picketing from being too broadly applied.
But the two concepts contain their own limitation: when the secondary
[Vol.l19:283
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employer does not control the details of the primary workers' perform-
ance and neither controls nor is controlled by the primary employer's
labor decisions, then picketing their immediate employer provides the
primary employees with all the opportunity for applying economic pres-
sure that a primary strike traditionally yields, and extending the dis-
pute is no longer necessary to protect that right. Whether the requisite
control is present in a given case is a question of fact for the Board, a
question which should be no more troublesome than the countless
similar decisions concerning motive and status made daily by the Board.
III. THE IMPACT OF General Electric
A. The Path of Precedent
After Ebasco and Irwin-Lyons, much early speculation centered
on whether a general contractor and subcontractors working for him
on the same construction project were a single enterprise or co-
employers. 94  Several circumstances favored such a holding: (1) the
employees of the general contractor and his subcontractors worked in
close physical proximity; (2) the secondary employees performed func-
tions essential to the fulfillment of the general contractor's obligations
under his contract; (3) general contractors customarily exercised ex-
tensive supervisory and financial control over any subcontractor they
engaged; and (4) the general contractor had the power to engage sub-
contractors whose lower union contracts, or lack of union contracts,
he preferred.
The Supreme Court appeared to resolve this controversy in 1951
with its decision in NLRB v. Denver Building Trades Council.95 In
Denver, the general contractor let the electrical work on its building
project to a nonunion subcontractor. The Building Trades Council
represented the employees of the general contractor and the other on-site
subcontractors. When the general contractor refused to terminate the
nonunion subcontractor's contract, the Council induced a general walk-
out. Rejecting without comment the argument successfully advanced
before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that
finding an 8(b) (4) (B) violation would establish a precedent permit-
ting general contractors to evade legitimate union pressure by subcon-
tracting essential functions,' 9" the Supreme Court held that an object of
194 Compare Denver Bldg. Trades Council v. NLRB, 186 F2d 326, 336-37 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 675 (1951) and Mills v. Plumbers Local 178, 83 F. Supp.
240 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (principal-subcontractor relationship creates an alliance), with
Electrical Workers Local F01 v. NLRB (Lanzer). 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950)
(principal-subcontractors in common venture not allied).
193341 U.S. 675 (1951), rev'g 186 F2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
196186 F.2d at 337.
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the walkout was to force the general contractor to "cease doing business"
with the nonunion subcontractor, and that the principal-subcontractor
relationship did not legitimize that intent.
[T]hat the contractor and subcontractor were engaged on
the same construction project, and that the contractor had
some supervision over the subcontractor's work, did not elim-
inate the status of each as an independent contractor or make
the employees of one the employees of the other. The busi-
ness relationship between independent contractors is too well
established in the law to be overridden without clear language
doing so.
1
07
Thus was established--despite protestations that the decision dis-
criminated against workers in the construction industry in which enter-
prises were historically created by subcontracting rather than through
unitary plants 's-the rule that functional integration of principals and
subcontractors was insufficient to involve either in the other's labor
disputes. In the years following this decision, the rule was extended to
encompass other industries, 199 to subcontractors occupying separate
premises,200 and to situations in which the degree of supervision or
107 341 U.S. at 689-90.
198 Justices Douglas and Reed dissented in Denver on the grounds that the situa-
tion's supervision and integration aspects were analogous to Ebasco and that basing
neutrality on whether the general contractor performed the contested work himself
or through subcontractors made the right to strike "dependent on fortui'ous business
arrangements that have no significance so far as the evils of the secondary boycott
are concerned." Id. at 693; accord, Baltimore Bldg. Tradls Council (John A.
Piezonki), 108 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1954), rev'd, 219 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1955). Former
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz commented along these lines that:
[T]hese "fortuitous" arrangements are no accident. Many considerations
govern the choice of a subcontractor before bids are submitted on a construc-
tion job, as well as afterward. One prime consideration is the nature and
source of the contractor's labor supply ...
No one can be taken by surprise in these si'uations. No one can claim
damage without advance warning. No one is an innocent bystander. Every-
one is well aware of the probable consequences of his own course of action.
Hearings on H.R. 6411 Before the Special Subcomin. on Labor of the House Comm.
on Education and Labor, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965).
199 See, e.g., Haughton v. Woodworkers Local 5-40, 294 F2d 766, 767 (9 h Cir.
1961), aff'g 168 F. Supp. 273 (D. Ore. 1958) (subcontracting equally customary in
logging industry) ; Milk Drivers Local 584 (Old Dutch Farms, Inc.), 146 N.L.R.B.
509 (1964), enforced, 341 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1965) (subcontracting of functions in
local dairy industry analogous to subcontracting in construction industry). One court
recently noted that:
[Tihere is logic to the building trades argument that, at least as to a general
contractor who had contracted to perform a total building job, no subcon-
tractor working on that job . . . should be regarded as entirely independent
or "neutral" in a lawful labor dispute with the general contractor. However,
whatever logic there may be to this argument has thus far been rejected by
the United States Supreme Court.
NLRB v. Nashville Bldg. Trades Council (Markwell & Hartz), 383 F.2d 562, 565
(6th Cir.), enforcing 164 N.L.R.B. 280 (1967) (citing Denver).
20o See, e.g., Longshoremen's Local 418 (Continental Grain Co.), 155 N.L.R.B.
402 (1965); Longshoremen's Local 13 (Catalina Island Sightseeing Lines), 124
N.L.R.B. 813. 831 (1959); Teamsters Local 996 (Waialua Dairy), 111 N.L.R.B.
1220, 1234 (1955).
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other interrelatedness far exceeded that in Denver.2 1  The Denver rule,
emphasizing the "independence" of independent contractors, became the
basis for the storage decisions 202 (although in those cases the sub-
contractors directly diminished the effect of the primary strike) ; the
main argument behind the Board's decisions barring the ally defense in
the "two hats" cases; 203 and the Board's rationale for refusing to
extend the coemployer concept beyond its "one-man" independent con-
tractor rule.2°4
Then the Supreme Court decided Electrical Workers Local 761 v.
NLRB (General Electric Corp.),205 the only other major case in which
it has directly treated the ally doctrine.20 ' General Electric involved
successful picketing by the aggrieved primary employees at a gate re-
served exclusively for employees of independent contractors working on
the primary employer's premises. In its opinion, the Court embarked
on a lengthy attempt to rationalize the Board's primary and common
situs decisions in terms of a proper definition of "primary activity,"
concluded that "[t]he key to the problem is found in the type of work
that is being performed" 207 by the independent contractors' employees,
and held that it would allow the Board to apply its Moore Dry Dock 208
rules for limiting common situs picketing only in the following circum-
stances, since only then were the independents truly secondary and a
common site present:
"[1] There must be a separate gate marked and set apart
from other gates; [2] the work done by the men who use the
gate must be unrelated to the normal operations of the [pri-
mary] employer and [3] the work must be of a kind that
would not, if done when the plant were engaged in its regular
operations, necessitate curtailing those operations." 209
201OE.g., Chauffeurs Local 135 (Hoosier Petroleum Co.), 106 N.L.R.B. 629
(1953), enforced, 212 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1954).
202See text accompanying notes 56-68 vt pra.
203 See text accompanying notes 146-52 supra.
204 See text accompanying notes 162-74 supra.
205 366 U.S. 667 (1961), rev'g 278 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1960), enfordg 123
N.L.R.B. 1547 (1959).
206 But see National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
20T 366 U.S. at 680.
208 Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950). In Moore Dry Dock, the Board
set out four standards for picketing in [common situs] situations which would
be presumptive of valid primary activity: (1) that the picketing be limited
to times when the situs of dispute was located on the secondary premises,
(2) that the primary employer be engaged in his normal business at the
situs, (3) that the picketing take place reasonably close to the situs, and
(4) that the picketing clearly disclose that the dispute was only with the
primary employer.
366 U.S. at 677.
209 Id. at 681-82 (quoting United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 289 F,2d 591, 595
(2d Cir. 1961)). The Board found on remand that the picketing was lawful.
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In all other situations employees of independent contractors performing
work for the primary on his premises became primary employees be-
cause they were doing primary work: appeals to them constituted the
"traditional primary activity of appealing to neutral employees whose
tasks aid the employer's everyday operations." 210 The following text
is concerned with the impact on the ally doctrine of the Court's second
and third primary-status criteria.
B. On Farmed-Out Struck Work
It has been argued above 211 that because the harm attacked by the
struck work doctrine is not secondary employees' performance of
strikers' work but the counterstrike benefit their performance affords
the primary employer, their performance of any work diminishing the
impact of the primary strike should be deemed to be the performance of
"struck work," making the secondary employer the primary's ally. An
examination of the reasons for the Supreme Court's third criterion for
primary status shows that in General Electric it implicitly approved and
extended this argument.
The Court adopted its General Electric criteria verbatim from the
decision in United Steelworkers Union v. NLRB (Phelps Dodge Re-
fining Corp.),212 in which the Second Circuit explained that
the contractors in this case were truly neutral and were not the
alter ego of the employer, taking over its ordinary business
and benefiting from the strike. . . . Nor was the work they
were engaged in of a kind that would have necessitated clos-
ing down or curtailing the activity at the plant so that by
hiring them after the strike began or in anticipation of it, the
employer was escaping from or mitigating the economic
effect of the strike.213
Because General Electric employees had formerly performed some of the work now
done by the independent contractors' employees, that work was "related to" General
Electric's normal operations, and the gate was therefore "mingled." 138 N.L.R.B.
342, 346 (1962).
210366 U.S. at 681. In United Steelworkers v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.), 376
U.S. 492 (1964), the Court, extending General Electric to secondaries aiding the
primary's normal operations by making deliveries through a reserved gate adjacent
to the primary's premises but not owned by it, reaffirmed its right to strike rationale
by stating that the primary employee could lawfully reach these secondaries directly,
not just incidentally to their appeals to primary employees. If all picketing at the
employer's premises was not necessarily primary, all appeals to secondary workers
were not necessarily secondary. For a fuller analysis of General Electric and its
progeny, see Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1385-91, 1417-20.
211 Text accompanying notes 41-42, 80-89 supra.
212289 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1961).
213 Id. at 595. The court based its decision on a finding that the separate gate
construcLed for the independent contractors' employees engaged in building a capital
improvement was so isolated from the main gate that an intent violative of the Act
could be inferred.
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Though independent contractors doing work which would require the
primary employer to halt production if there were no strike are not
doing the strikers' work," 4 and though they do not thereby carry on
any aspect of the primary's normal business, 2 15 they are performing
work for which the primary would not have made arrangements with-
out the strike. By allowing the primary to capitalize on the normally
unprofitable hiatus created by the strike, these independent contractors
help the primary to diminish the strike's impact. Consequently, their
employees are reachable as "strikebreakers" even if a separate gate is
established.216
C. On the Single Enterprise and Coemployer Concepts
The question raised by General Electric's second criterion for pri-
mary status is more momentous: does the requirement that the work
performed by the secondary be related to the primary's "normal opera-
tions" apply to common situs cases as well as to cases such as General
Electric in which the dispute occurs at the primary's premises? In
other words, does General Electric overrule Denver sub silentio by treat-
ing independent contractors performing functions essential to the gen-
eral contractor's operations as part of the latter's enterprise? The
Board first faced this issue in Building Trades Council of New Orleans
(Markwell and Hartz, Inc.),217 and the thicket of opinions produced by
that case provides a fruitful basis for further discussion.
Markwell, a general contractor, subcontracted twenty percent of
the work required under its contract to electrical and piledriving sub-
contractors and performed the remainder with its own employees. On
October 17 the union striking Markwell picketed all four gates at the
214 Heavy maintenance workers whose duties usually require that production halt
would be an exception, but the primary would be unlikely to keep such workers on
the regular payroll instead of contracting for them as the need arose. If he did
choose to contract with them, they would be amenable to picketing as secondaries
performing the primary's "related work." See text accompanying notes 217-54 infra.
215But cf. Seafarers Int'l Union v. NLRB (Salt Dome Production Co.), 265
F,2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959), denyinq enforcement to 119 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1958)
(repairs are normal business under the second Moore Dry Dock rule), criticized in
Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1423-25.
2 1 6 See Automotive Employees Local 618 v. NLRB (Incorporated Oil Co.),
249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1957), denying enforcement to 116 N.L.R.B. 1844 (1956);
Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1418-19. The General Electric Court's test makes the
performance of such work an apparently irrebuttable presumption of the primary's
intent to evade the strike, thus demonstrating the strong policy behind, and the
deterrent aspects of, the struck work doctrine. In the "normal" strikebreaking
situation, the primary would have an opportunity to rebut the inference arising from
such subcontracting by showing that he would have transferred the challenged work
regardless of the strike. See text accompanying notes 69-79 supra. But when the
work transferred is not work which would normally be performed by the strikers,
the employer cannot possibly justify the transfer on economic grounds because the
sole effect of the savings accomplished is to diminish the effect of the primary strike.
217 155 N.L.R.B. 319 (1965).
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construction site, inducing the subcontractors' workmen to refuse to
cross the picket line. On October 23 Markwell reserved three of the
gates for the exclusive use of the subcontractors and deliverymen, in-
cluding those making deliveries to Markwell. The union continued to
picket the reserved gates, the subcontractors' workmen remained out-
side, and Markwell finished the piledriving with its own employees. 218
On November 14, Markwell reserved two gates for its own employees
and suppliers and two exclusively for the subcontractors and their sup-
pliers; and on November 16 a third gate was reserved for the sub-
contractors, leaving only one for Markwell's employees. The picketing
continued as before. Except that the primary employer was operating
on another's premises, the relevant aspects of the final situation 219 were
thus identical to the facts in General Electric.
The district court granted a temporary injunction, reasoning that
because Markwell did not usually perform electrical work or piledriving,
these tasks were "unrelated" to its normal operations, and the sub-
contractors doing them could not be reached.22 ° A bare majority of
the Board found unlawful only that picketing occurring after November
16,"l enunciating several reasons for this outcome. First, General
Electric and United Steelworkers Union v. NLRB (Carrier Corp.) 222
were "inapposite" because they dealt with picketing at the primary
employer's premises and merely represented the "policy that lenient
treatment be given to strike action taking place at the separate premises
of a struck employer." 223 Second, the Moore Dry Dock rules gained
"express approval" in General Electric, and the Board should continue
its tradition of applying them to common situs situations. Launching
into this analysis, the Board explained that:
Applying the Moore Dry Dock standards to the instant
case requires the timing and location of the picketing . . .
to be tailored to reach the employees of the primary employer,
rather than those of the neutral employer, and deviations from
these requirements establish the secondary object of the picket-
ing and render it unlawful.224
218 Id. at 322.
219 That the primary designated the reserved gate after the dispute began was
plainly irrelevant. The case from which the General Electric criteria were taken
involved a gate reserved in anticipation of a strike, United Steelworkers Union
(Phelps Dodge Refining Corp.), 126 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1371 (1960), enforced, 289 F.2d
591 (2d Cir. 1961), and General Electric itself hinged primary status on whether a
gate was reserved, not when.
220 Paschal v. Building Trades Council, 225 F. Supp. 845, 847 (E.D. La. 1964).
221 155 N.L.R.B. at 326 & n22.
222376 U.S. 492 (1964).
223 155 N.L.R.B. at 326.
224 Id.
[Vo1.119:283
THE ALLY DOCTRINE
By continuing to picket at the neutral gates after the change effected on
November 16, the union "failed to comply." 225 Finally, a contrary
finding would overrule Denver doubly because it would make the pri-
mary and secondary employers "concerned" or "primary" "not only
where the overarching general contractor on the building site is the
primary employer, but also, where the intertwined work of a construc-
tion subcontractor is the primary target." 226
Two members entered a lengthy dissent emphasizing that General
Electric prescribed a general test for the status of all picketing; that
the whole thrust of Carrier and General Electric was that appeals to
secondary employees whose work furthered primaries' operations were
primary activity; and that the Board could not then rely solely on the
picketing's location to determine its legality without looking at the
type of work done by those to whom the appeal was made:
The crucial consideration regarding [General Electric] is not,
as the majority apparently views it, that it was made with
respect to conduct occurring in connection with a strike at an
industrial plant, but that it held that appeals to respect a picket
line made to employees of secondary employers whose opera-
tions do not meet the [General Electric] tests . . . constitute
legitimate primary activity .... 227
Moreover, the dissenters noted, if General Electric were inapplicable,
the Board could not justify outlawing the picketing after November 16
without outlawing the picketing after October 23,228 because the only
possible grounds for this distinction were that the separate gate pro-
tected the secondary employees per se or that appeals to secondary
employees were unlawful if not incidental to appeals to primary em-
ployees. Neither of these grounds supported the distinction, however,
since the first was a General Electric requirement, while the Court
expressly repudiated the other in Carrier.2
Noting that "[t] he majority advances no reason why an employer
in the construction industry should be permitted to designate or limit
the places of primary activity against him, while those in other indus-
tries may not do so," 230 the dissenters argued that holding General
Electric applicable to common situs cases would not be equivalent to
treating the general contractor and his subcontractors as a single enter-
prise or as coemployers. Applying General Electric's criteria would
2251 Id. at 326-27.
2 26 1d. at 328.
227 Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
2281d. at 333.
229 376 U.S. at 498.
20 155 N.L.R.B. at 334 n.32.
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only permit appeals to secondary employees to respect a picket line, not
picketing designed to induce concerted activity by the secondary em-
ployees against their own employer away from that line. The Moore
Dry Dock rules could still be applied to outlaw the latter. Whenever
the work performed by the secondary employees was "unrelated" to the
primary's normal operations or was strikebreaking under the third
General Electric criterion, those rules would apply in full. Finally, the
dissenters suggested Markwell was distinguishable from Denver be-
cause in Denver other indicia of unlawful intent existed: the picketing
was not limited to invoking respect for the picket line, and the initial
dispute was with a subcontractor rather than the general contractor.
2 31
On petition for enforcement, the Markwell case split the Fifth
Circuit's panel into thirds. 2 Judge Connally's majority opinion noted
that General Electric cited Denver with apparent approval, rejected the
dissent's suggested distinctions between the two cases, and held that the
"relatedness" of the subcontractors' work to Markwell's normal activi-
ties was irrelevant because Denver controlled. Because the subcon-
tractors were neutrals under Denver, picketing them was not activity
reasonably directed towards the primary dispute, and the union had no
cognizable defense to the charge that it had acted with a secondary
object.233 Judge Rives, concurring specially, found the subcontractors'
tasks "related" because Markwell was obligated to accomplish both the
piledriving and the electrical work, and could have done so with its
own employees; but he concluded that the Moore Dry Dock rules made
the picketing illegal without explaining why he was discussing "related
work" when that doctrine's only purpose was to protect certain picketing
independently of Moore Dry Dock. 34 Judge Wisdom's dissent seemed
to go farther than even the dissenting Board members. Arguing that
the General Electric Court used the term "common situs" to mean any
231 rd. at 335 & n.3i; see McLeod v. Milk Drivers Local 584 (Old Dutch Farms,
Inc.), 54 L.R.R.M. 2287 (E.D N.Y. 1963) (§ 10(1) proceeding), in which the court
held that an independent contractor processing the primary's milk on shared premises
owned by the contractor was allied with the primary because the processing aided
the primary, but added in dicta that:
The uncertain inference from the last part of the General Electric case
might similarly dissolve the element of secondary boycott if that language
is taken to mean that subcontracting an integral part of an essentially
unitary business function precludes treating the subcontractor as a neutral
employer. . . . [The processori is little more than the incorporated per-
former of a function integral to the business of [the primary], notwithstanding
the legal clarity of the independent contractor relationship.
Id. at 2289. In the subsequent proceeding the Board never mentioned this issue.
Milk Drivers Local 584 (Old Dutch Farms, Inc.), 146 N.L.R.B. 509 (1964).
232 Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1967).
233 Id. at 83.
234 Id. at 84. The dissenters below found the subcontractors' work "related"
for similar reasons, 155 N.L.R.B. at 335 n.35, adding that "we reject the General
Counsel's view that the 'unrelated work' condition is met unless the work is 'identical
or substantially similar' to that of the primary employer." Id. at 336 n.39.
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situation in which primary and secondary employers were present, and
that the majority opinion by permitting general contractors to "frustrate
the purposes of [primary] picketing by opening gates reserved for
[their] subcontractors" was applying more restrictive standards to the
construction industry than any other, he pointed out that Denver merely
held that "contractors and subcontractors . . . are not necessarily so
interconnected that they should all be regarded as one entity," 235 and
suggested that holding "related work" subcontractors nonneutral would
not overrule the earlier case. "Under General Electric, not all inde-
pendent contractors are neutrals: They lose their neutral status when
their work is related ('necessary') to the normal or day-to-day opera-
tions of the primary employer." " The obvious implication of this
analysis is that whether the dispute is with the general contractor or a
subcontractor, if one's work is related to the other's operations the
whole site could be picketed.
Regardless of their differences all three judges treated Markwell as
having profound potential impact on the single enterprise and coem-
ployer concepts, as well they might. Despite the dissenting Board
members' claim that they were merely protecting the primary picket line,
making General Electric applicable to common sites would have pre-
cisely the same effect, at least when the dispute is with the general
contractor, as holding the employers present there to be a single enter-
prise, and would have made Justice Douglas' Denver dissent the law.
The argument that General Electric overruled Denver sub silentio
is not without substance. Although the Supreme Court cited Denver
in its General Electric opinion, it did so not for that case's holding or
specific reasoning but for general language with which no one would
quarrel. -37 The same ambiguity attends the Court's citation of Moore
Dry Dock, for while the Dry Dock rules were also "approved" in the
General Electric opinion, the precise meaning for which they were cited
is unclear, and the unexplained citation provides no guarantee that the
Court also intended to adopt the Board's "traditional mode" of applying
them. The Moore Dry Dock rules have been given two widely diver-
gent meanings, although their verbal form has remained unchanged.2
First, they have been treated as tests for when a union may picket a
secondary site in appealing to primary employees. Under this inter-
pretation, failure to comply is merely evidence of an unlawful object, so
235 387 F2d at 89.
236 Id.
237 The Court used language from its Denver decision to support the propositions
that § 8(b) (4) (B) could not be literally construed, 366 U.S. at 672. and that the
section's purpose was to balance the competing rights of strikers and secondaries.
Id. at 679.
235 See Gravamen, spra note 6, at 1421.
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that compliance with them will not save picketing which is found to have
appealed in fact to secondary employees. Secondly, they have also been
treated as tests for when the union may lawfully appeal to secondary
employees at a secondary site. Under this interpretation, compliance
with the rules protects picketing even if it appeals to secondary em-
ployees. The first interpretation is unfavorable to the union because it
implies that appeals to secondary employees at secondary sites are never
lawful; the second is more favorable because it permits such appeals
if the requirements of Moore Dry Dock are literally obeyed. By ex-
clusively relying on the union's conduct as a test for the object of the
picketing, the Markwell majorities implicitly adopted the first inter-
pretation as the Board's "traditional approach." But the General
Electric Court seemed to lean toward the second interpretation in en-
dorsing the nature of the secondary employees' work as the conclusive
test of the primary employees' object. Likewise, the Board's Markwell
dissenters, arguing that related work determines intent and that me-
chanical compliance with Moore Dry Dock precludes any inference of
unlawful object, apparently adopted this second interpretation as well." 9
Denver's blanket holding that employees of independent subcontractors,
as neutrals, may not be appealed to on the jobsite is thus "sicklied o'er
with the pale cast" of later thought. 4
Moreover, it is difficult to square the Court's generally stated
criteria-which were delivered at the end of a sweeping assessment of
the entire secondary-pressure area-with a narrow restriction of those
criteria to the primary site facts on which General Electric arose. The
General Electric Court had before it the painfully cautious limitations of
the Rice Milling case,21 and could easily have adopted similar restric-
tions had it desired such a result. Furthermore, the distinction between
primary and common site cases relied upon by the Markwell majorities
seems irrelevant to the Court's broad desire to preserve the "traditional
primary activity of appealing to neutral employees whose tasks aid the
239 See also Steelworkers Local 6991 (Auburndale Freezer Corp.), 177 N.L.R.B.
No. 108, 71 L.R.R.M. 1503 (1969) rev'd and remanded, 75 L.R.R.M. 2753 (5th Cir.
1970) (properly limited picketing of independent secondary warehouse held lawful
because work related to primary's operations was performed there, making it a
common site though no primary employees were present). But cf. Electrical Workers
Local 480 v. NLRB (Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co.), 413 F2d 1085. 1089-90
(D.C. Cir. 1969) ; NLRB (Sunset Int'l Petro. Corp.) v. Northern Calif. Dist.
Council of Hod Carriers, 389 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1968) (courts accepting Board's
more recent espousal of original and more restrictive Moore Dry Dock interpretation).
240 The Court's famous observation that the Moore Dry Dock standards have
been "mechanically applied," 366 U.S. at 677, does not provide a persuasive counter-
argument. The "mechanism" to which the Court disparagingly referred was used
to restrict the bounds of legitimate activity, but the Court in General Electric was
expanding those bounds in the same way that a "mechanically applied" rule that
complying with Moore Dry Dock protects secondary activity does.
241 NLRB v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 668, 672, 674 (1951),
cited in Electrical Workers Local 761 v. NLRB (General Electric Corp.), 366 U.S.
667, 672 (1961).
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employer's everyday operations," 242 when work performed by a sec-
ondary's employees aids a general contractor's operations in precisely
the same way that it would a manufacturer's operations. Finally, the
argument that by overruling Denver the Court would have been legis-
lating, because Congress had previously refused to change the rule, is
likewise unpersuasive. Although several attempts to overrule Denver
legislatively have failed,243 their failure is less indicative of congressional
approval of the Denver rule than of "the practical impossibility, in the
labor area, of enacting an isolated measure at all controversial." 24
That some congressmen have been motivated to propose altering the
rule suggests instead a general feeling that Denver is less than the
proper law of the land.24 The Supreme Court has "legislated" in
other sensitive areas when it became impatient with legislative process;
such action should not shock us here.
The acid test for whether General Electric overruled Denver, how-
ever, is whether application of the General Electric criteria to common
situs cases can be meaningfully limited to anything less than a complete
overruling. The apparently better founded argument-and the one
which would surely be the union's fall-back position were M1Iarkwell
before the Court-is that General Electric modified rather than over-
ruled Denver, preserving the possibility of independent contractors'
neutrality by providing a more realistic test than "an object" of the
picketers' conduct for balancing the rights with which Denver was
properly concerned. General Electric "corrected" Denver with respect
to what constitutes "an object," 246 and may have refined Denver's
242 366 U.S. at 681.
243 See Carroll, Common Situs Picketing: A Pending Amendment to Section
8(b)(4), 43 U. DEr. L.J. 731 (1966); Cushman, Secondary Boycotts and the Taft-
Hartley Law, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 120-23 (1954). See also H.R. Rep. No.
1041, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-4 (1965).
244 Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1425 n.291.
245 Dissatisfaction with the Denver rule is also suggested by the Board's willing-
ness to accept union attempts to evade the rule by "building a record" of greater
control by the general contractor over the subcontractor than was present on the
facts stated in the Denver opinion, despite the almost certain presence of such control
in the Denver situation itself. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 982 (J. H. Barker Trucking
Co.), 181 N.L.R.B. No. 67, - L.R.R.M. - (1970), and cases cited therein.246 See Comment, Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 77 YALE L.J.
1401, 1404-05 (1968) (arguing that General Electric overruled Denver). In Denver
the Court spoke strictly of the object of the picketing. 341 U.S. at 688-89. In
General Electric, however, the Court elaborated:
"Almost all picketing, even at the situs of the primary employer and surely
at that of the secondary, hopes to achieve the forbidden objective, whatever
other motives there may be and however small the chances of success." But
picketing which induces secondary employees to respect a picket line is not
the equivalent of picketing which has an object of inducing those employees
to engage in concerted conduct against their employer in order to force him
to refuse to deal with the struck employer.
366 U.S. at 673-74 (citations omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Teamsters Local 294,
284 F.2d 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1960)).
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conception of the determinants for whether activity is primary.
247
The problem created by this "modification" argument, as by the
outright overruling argument, lies in distinguishing disputes with
on-site subcontractors performing integrated operations from disputes
with the general contractor. Permitting the general contractor's work-
men to appeal to employees of the various subcontractors presents
little difficulty because the general contractor, by exercising its power
to engage only those subcontractors with whose labor policies it agrees,
effectively determines their employees' working conditions-a situation
wholly analogous to General Electric. But the subcontractors have no
such power over the general contractor's employees, and the general
contractor's operations do not aid theirs in the same sense. Further-
more, permitting the employees of the subcontractors to reach the
general contractor is the exact converse of General Electric-a case in
which the Court would not have allowed subcontractors' striking
workers to appeal to General Electric's employees.2 48  Yet if General
Electric's purpose was to preserve the full scope of the primary em-
ployees' right to strike those determining their working conditions, the
general contractor should equally be an ally when the primary dispute
is with the subcontractor, for he equally controls the disputing em-
ployees' working conditions, and his employees and the subcontractor's
workers are equally "fellows."
As the Markwell dissenters realized, this problem will be resolved,
if at all, by a definition of "related work" which reconciles the strikers'
rights with the independent contractors' claim to invulnerability.
24 9
But it is when the problem is considered in "related work" terms that
its dimensions are fully revealed. On the one hand, all subcontracting
aiding the primary's normal operations cannot be held "related" to
those operations, for all subcontracting does so directly or indirectly,
or the primary would not have contracted for it. Such a result, uni-
versally applied, would erase section 2 (3)'s 250 protection of independent
247 As judge Wisdom noted in his Markwell dissent, Denver looked only to the
object of the picketers as inferred from their conduct to determine their activity's
legality, but General Electric established an additional factor which is also intended
to preserve the traditional right to strike. 387 F.2d at 84.
248 366 U.S. at 668.
2 49 See 155 N.L.R.B. at 335 n.35. The meaning of the phrase "related work"
remains open, for while the Court in General Electric held "conventional maintenance
work necessary to the normal operations," 366 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added), of
the primary and deliveries to the primary to be "related," it did not define the
italicized phrase, and deliveries are not at issue here. Compare National Maritime
Union (Farmers Union Grain Terminal), 152 N.L.R.B. 1447, 1460 (1965) (away
from the primary's premises "related work" is that normally performed by the
primary), with Oil Workers Local 4-23 (Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Co.),
173 N.L.R.B. No. 195, 69 L.R.R.M. 1569, 1570 (1968) (test for relatedness is
whether primary employer's workers always perform the work or whether maintaining
the primary's normal operations requires it).25 0 NLRA §2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
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contractors from the Act. On the other hand, a definition of "related
work" focusing on the degree to which the subcontracted work is
necessary to the primary employer's operations would be overly vague
and therefore dependent upon the decisionmaker's subjective stand-
ards."' Even if the definition were somehow standardized, it would
give employees of construction subcontractors a more free-wheeling
right to strike than employees in other industries, simply because the
on-site operations of any construction contractor are too dependent on
those of all the others to be separated from them on "necessity"
grounds. 5 2
Professor Lesnick has suggested a "related work" test based on
whether the effect on the secondary employers is greater than that
which would be caused by the total absence of the primary's em-
ployees, 3 but this test seems open to the same objection in situations
such as Markwell. Because the operations of all employers on a con-
struction site are generally so intertwined that the stoppage of one's
operation at some point will require all the others to cease working,
such a definition would also permit subcontractors' workers to picket
the general contractor pursuant to a dispute with their immediate em-
ployer. Other definitions couched in terms such as "that work normally
done by the primary" or "that work whose assignment the primary
controls" are similarly unsatisfactory-the first because its result is
identical to Denver, the second because a right of control test is too
easily manipulated by collusive employers.
The conclusion seems inescapable that when General Electric is
applied to common site situations, it cannot be workably limited to
disputes with the general contractor. Thus, if the Denver and Markwell
results are unsatisfactory, the alternatives are equally unpalatable.
Either Denver is overruled absolutely, a result that would empty
section 2(3) of its meaning for the construction industry and increase
the dislocating effect of strikes; or Denver stands, unduly restricting
the primary employees' right to picket the entire site when it is in
fact a single enterprise. When the alternatives are equally intractable
and the social policy beneath a law requires its expansion, but a viable
251 The problems with such a test are explored in the discussion of Priest Logging,
text accompanying notes 58-68 supra.
252 This may reflect recognition that a construction site is in fact a single enter-
prise and that the construction workers' right to strike should generally be wider
than that of other workers. But such a result would eliminate the "unconcerned"
independent from the construction industry, and would defeat the argument's premise
by overruling Denver instead of modifying it.
253 The crucial question . . . is: does the picketing union intend to subject
the secondary employer to a loss of the services of his employees broader in
impact than would be directly caused by the unavailability, as a result of
the complete success of the strike, of the services of the primary employees?
If so, the picketing is secondary; otherwise, it is primary.
Gravamen, supra note 6, at 1414.
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limit cannot logically be justified, only the legislature can demarcate an
acceptable middle ground.25 The future of the ally doctrine with re-
spect to common site activities when struck work is not present rests
in Congress' halting hands.
IV. CONCLUSION
All three aspects of the ally doctrine grow from the same base-
the need to preserve, in the interest of industrial peace, the full scope
of primary employees' right to strike their employers for better wages
and working conditions. The rationale may also be phrased as the
need to prevent the primary employer from evading the impact of the
primary strike on his business. However the doctrine is stated, neither
the Board nor the courts have rationally applied it, though the situation
is improving. In the struck work area, the standards and operative
facts are relatively clear, yet the Board and the courts have been over-
cautious in extending the Royal Typewriter rule to instances logically
covered by its reasoning. In the single enterprise area, the standards
and operative facts are more tenuous, and they have first pounced, then
retreated from the implications of their decisions. In the coemployer
area, the Board has simply been recalcitrant, while the courts have
exhibited a tendency to become obtuse. Such inconsistency makes
reasoned prediction of the rules which should determine conduct unduly
difficult and breeds superfluous litigation and industrial strife.
Substantial reasons exist for the reluctance of these decisionmaking
bodies to extend the ally doctrine to all situations to which its rationale
would seem to carry; but if the right to strike can be fully protected by
viable rules which do not trench upon secondary employers' claims to
be free from disputes which are genuinely "not their own," then the
decisionmakers should so protect it. If the statute does not allow the
Board and the courts to create judicial rules which will adequately
protect this right, then Congress should act to provide a remedy.
254Although courts rightly feel constrained by §2(3) of the NLRA, Congress
could modify its language to eliminate the protection of "independent contractors"
in on-site construction situations. Congress could also find as a matter of policy
that treating construction sites as single enterprises, either for all disputes or for
those with the general contractor, does not produce the type of proliferating economic
dislocation with which the Act is concerned.
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